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The	final	stretch	of	2019	has	been	marked	by	the	emergence	of	some	–	as	yet	
highly	 incipient	 –	 signs	 that	 the	 pace	 of	 global	 growth	 is	 stabilising.	These 
signs are so far very tentative and will need to be confirmed in the coming months. 
Following the gradual worsening witnessed since spring 2018, these somewhat 
more favourable signs have been accompanied by some easing in the degree of 
uncertainty over several factors of risk. On one hand, the Chinese and US authorities 
have been emitting (occasionally contradictory) messages pointing towards a degree 
of détente in the trade conflict between both countries. On the other, as regards 
Brexit, the recent UK election results appear, for the moment, to have lessened the 
probability of the most unfavourable scenario of an EU withdrawal by the UK without 
a prior agreement materialising. All told, solely the conclusion of a new trade 
agreement, the negotiation of which will foreseeably be neither straightforward nor 
swift, can dispel this element of uncertainty. 
Reflecting	this	rather	more	favourable	scenario	has	been	some	increase	in	the	
appetite	for	risk	on	financial	markets. Albeit with ups and downs, relating mainly 
to the see-sawing negotiations between the United States and China, these 
developments have entailed moderate stock market gains, a modest rise in sovereign 
debt yields in the advanced economies and a compression of corporate debt spreads. 
The	signs	of	stabilising	activity	at	the	global	level	have	also	been	patent	in	the	
euro	 area.	 Given its high degree of external openness, the euro area has been 
particularly affected over the past year and a half by weaker trade. Moreover, it has felt 
with particular intensity the specific shocks impacting the car industry. The loss of 
momentum in activity has been more marked in the manufacturing sectors – which are 
more trade-dependent – than in services, whose link to domestic demand is greater. 
And this against a background in which favourable financial conditions and, in the case 
of private consumption, rises in real wages and robust employment have been 
conducive to household and business spending. Nonetheless, the indicators of activity 
in the services sector have also tended to turn down somewhat. Sector by sector, this 
has been sharper in those with greater links to manufacturing activity. In any event, the 
latest information suggests the pace of output is stabilising, albeit at a very low rate. 
The	 latest	 Eurosystem	 projections	 have	 scarcely	 entailed	 any	 changes	 in	 the	
expected	 paths	 of	 GDP	 and	 inflation	 in	 the	 coming	 years.1 Following several 
1 OVERVIEW
1  See the Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2019-2022): the Banco de España’s 
contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2019 joint forecasting exercise.
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consecutive quarters in which the outlook for euro area activity had been revised 
downwards, the December projections, covering 2022 for the first time, have kept the 
GDP growth path practically unchanged. This is the outcome, on one hand, of a worsening 
of the external environment compared with the projections made three months earlier, 
and, on the other, of the greater expected support of fiscal policy. Nor on the prices front 
do the new projections entail significant changes compared with the previous forecasts. 
In 2022, at the end of the new projection horizon, the inflation rate will, in annual average 
terms, stand at 1.6%, still some distance off the monetary policy objective. 
The	debate	on	the	most	appropriate	economic	policy	mix	is	veering	towards	a	
more	active	 role	 for	 fiscal	policy.	The stickiness of inflation rates in respect of 
convergence towards the medium-term monetary policy objectives and the 
weakening in global activity and trade since early 2018 have driven the debate about 
the most appropriate contribution monetary policy and fiscal policy can make in 
overcoming this situation. To date, monetary policy has made a decisive contribution 
in helping reverse these dynamics. However, the narrower leeway available to this 
economic policy tool has given rise to calls for a more active use of fiscal policy. And 
this especially so given the evidence that the capacity of a budgetary expansion to 
positively affect activity and prices is all the greater when interest rates are close to 
their lower bound. In the specific case of the euro area, this advises countries in a 
more favourable fiscal position to use the headroom available to push through 
expansionary budgetary policies. These would focus particularly on investment 
projects with a high positive impact on long-term growth.2 Yet there is broad 
consensus that the priority for those other economies with high debt levels, as is 
Spain’s case, should continue to be to attain a healthier budgetary position, so that 
greater room for manoeuvre may be generated to combat any sharper slowdown in 
activity in the future. In any event, the lack of instruments in the euro area to enable 
the fiscal policies designed domestically to give rise to an appropriate budgetary 
stance area-wide calls for centralised fiscal instruments that meet this objective. 
The	pace	of	output	in	the	Spanish	economy,	which	the	downturn	in	the	external	
environment	has	also	affected,	has	stabilised	in	the	final	stretch	of	the	year.	As 
in the euro area as a whole, the feedback loop between increased uncertainty and the 
slowdown in global demand has, since 2018, particularly affected the manufacturing 
sectors, contributing to the slowdown in output. However, the course of industrial 
activity has been comparatively more favourable throughout this year than in the other, 
larger euro area economies. Moreover, though in these latter countries the unfavourable 
trend in manufacturing has affected the services sectors, the impact in Spain has been 
less severe, particularly compared with Germany and Italy. This partly reflects the 
lesser weight of services sector invoicing targeted on manufacturing industry.3
2  See Box 3 “Fiscal policy in the euro area in 2020: outlook and assessment”.
3  See Box 8 “The recent slowdown in activity from a sectoral perspective”.
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The	easing	in	activity	in	Spain	in	2019	is	also	due	partly	to	the	loss	of	momentum	
of	domestic	demand. The initial phases of the recovery were characterised by very 
pronounced increases in the various components of domestic spending. This phase 
saw, in particular, a sizeable volume of decisions taken on consumer durables and 
business and residential investment that had been postponed during the crisis. The 
release of pent-up demand is, in the main, coming to an end, and it contributes along 
with the impact of greater uncertainty to explaining the slowdown in domestic demand.4 
As	a	result	of	these	developments,	the	increase	in	GDP	in	2019	Q2	and	Q3	was	
0.4%,	one	of	the	lowest	figures	posted	since	the	recovery	began.	However, as 
has been the case throughout this stage, the Spanish economy has continued to 
grow at a higher rate than the euro area as a whole. The expansion in output has 
continued to be underpinned by domestic demand, as may be inferred – short-term 
volatility aside – from the joint consideration of both quarters. 
The	information	available	for	Q4	points	to	GDP	growth	similar	to	that	of	the	
previous	 quarter.	 Continuing easy financing conditions, to which the ECB’s 
expansionary monetary policy stance is contributing, and the ongoing restructuring 
of the private sector financial position are factors of support for household and 
business consumption and investment decisions. In the case of households, 
MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a)
Table 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 27 November 2019. The shaded cells in grey are Banco de España projections.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP, in percentage points.
c The figure for 2019 Q4 is the average of the October and November year-on-year rates.
91028102
2018 2019 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
National accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
4.04.04.05.06.05.05.05.00.24.2tcudorp citsemod ssorG    
3.01.11.04.02.04.00.14.07.16.2)b( dnamed lanoitan fo noitubirtnoC    
    Contribution of net external demand (b) -0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.7 0.1
Year-on-year rate of change
1.18.15.27.27.25.24.26.20.25.2tnemyolpmE    
    Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) 1.7 0.8 1.1 1.8 2.3 1.8 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.3
    Harmonised index of consumer prices excluding 
    energy and food 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.1
Price indicators (c)
4  See Box 6 “The relationship between the behaviour of consumption and employment during the recovery”.
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moreover, the rise in their income, based on robust job creation and the growth of 
real wages, is also allowing saving to increase. However, corporate income has 
begun to look flatter. Foreign trade flows have quickened somewhat in recent 
months, largely reflecting the more pronounced increase in exports and imports 
related to the car sector. A year earlier, there had been a significant fall-off in this 
sector as a result of the entry into force of the new emissions regulations. 
In	 recent	months	 a	 similar	 pace	of	 job	 creation	 to	 that	 observed	 since	 the	
spring	has	been	sustained,	one	more	moderate	than	was	previously	the	case.	
In terms of the series of Social Security registrations, employment to November 
suggests that the quarter-on-quarter rate of this variable in Q4 is, as in Q3, expected 
to be 0.4%. That entails a stabilisation of the rate of net job creation at a lower level 
than that observed in 2018, when quarter-on-quarter growth was running at between 
0.7% and 0.8%. 
The	inflation	rate	remains	at	a	low	level. In November, HICP growth rose slightly 
to 0.5%, 0.3 pp up on the two previous months. This was partly due to the base 
effects of oil price developments a year earlier on the energy component, and partly 
to the continuation of the rise in the food component. Nonetheless, core inflation 
was 1.1% in November, a very similar rate to that seen since late 2017. So far, 
therefore, no pass-through to final prices of the relatively marked rise in unit labour 
costs since then has been observed. 
Despite the slowdown in expected growth for Q4, activity in Spain continues to post higher rates than in the euro area. Inflation continues to 
grow at a moderate rate, below that for the euro area as a whole.
SPAIN: ACTIVITY REMAINS BUOYANT AND CONSUMER PRICES ARE HOLDING AT A LOW RATE OF INCREASE (a)
Chart 1
SOURCES: Eurostat INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change on the seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rates of change on the original 
series, in the case of the consumer price indices.
b The figure for Q4 is a Banco de España projection.
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The	 latest	 Banco	 de	 España	 projections	 foresee	 a	 prolongation	 of	 the	
expansionary	phase	over	 the	next	 three	years.5 Under the assumptions used, 
namely those of the Eurosystem’s December staff projections exercise6, the 
uncertainty that has been clouding global activity and trade for the past year and a 
half is expected to progressively dispel beyond the short term. That should give rise 
to a gradual recovery in external demand and, consequently, to livelier export activity. 
At the same time, the exhaustion of some of the recent expansionary impulses will 
mean that the GDP growth rate will undergo some further easing, converging towards 
the rate of increase of potential output. These diminishing impulses include the 
petering out of the pent-up demand for consumption and investment during the 
crisis and the projected neutral stance in the case of budgetary policy, as opposed 
to the recent expansionary stance. 
As	 described	 at	 the	 start	 of	 this	 section,	 this	 baseline	 scenario	 for	 the	
expansion	of	activity	remains,	as	in	the	recent	past,	subject	to	downside	risks.	
Their	intensity	has,	however,	tended	recently	to	ease	somewhat.	The risks of 
output growth not attaining the projected rates stem mainly from the external 
environment. This will be in the event that trade tensions should persist to a greater 
extent than envisaged in the baseline scenario, that further difficulties should arise 
in connection with Brexit and that the expansionary policies applied in China should 
not manage to mitigate the slowdown in the Chinese economy.7 
Reducing	 the	 vulnerability	of	 the	Spanish	economy	ahead	of	 future	 shocks	
calls	for	a	resolute	boost	to	the	budgetary	consolidation	measures	and	to	the	
structural	 reform	 agenda.	 On the domestic front, the prolongation of the 
expansionary phase would be strengthened by the formation of a stable government 
that were first, to implement policies aimed at resuming fiscal consolidation, which 
would help broaden the budgetary room for manoeuvre ahead of potential adverse 
situations; and further, to promote measures geared to increasing long-term growth. 
On one hand, in the fiscal realm, the reduction of the deficit has, throughout the 
recovery, been underpinned especially by the favourable effects of the economic 
cycle and by the reduction in interest expenses, as a result of the decline in financing 
costs. But there has scarcely been any headway in correcting the structural deficit, 
which restricts the capacity of fiscal policy to face any future change in the economic 
cycle. On the other hand, the plans postponed in recent years to adopt the reforms 
needed to increase the economy’s productivity and its job creation capacity must be 
revived. 
5  See the Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2019-2022): the Banco de España’s 
contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2019 joint forecasting exercise.
6  See “Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, December 2019”.
7  See Box 2 The impact of the Chinese economy on the euro area and Spain through European value chains 
for an assessment of the consequences of the various alternative scenarios for the Chinese economy.
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The US economy has slowed in recent quarters. It has 
mainly been affected by the weakness of global economic 
activity and, domestically, by the exhaustion of the fiscal 
stimuli. Given the economy’s weight internationally, it is 
worth assessing to what extent the slowdown is likely to 
step up in the coming quarters. In this connection, this 
box describes the main pillars that would underpin growth 
in this economy in the short term, the main risks and 
vulnerabilities it faces and the economic policy headroom 
available to attempt to mitigate any further downturn in 
activity.
Over the past year US GDP growth has slowed from a 
year-on-year rate of around 3% to approximately 2%. This 
is a very similar rate to that of potential growth, estimated 
by the Federal Reserve to be 1.9% (see Chart  1.1). 
Headway in the US economy over this period has rested 
essentially on the buoyancy of private consumption (see 
Chart 1.2), to which the increases in household income 
and wealth have been conducive. Specifically, favourable 
labour market developments in recent years have 
prompted an increase in household income owing to the 
rise in both employment and wages, which have outgrown 
inflation (see Chart  1.3). Looking ahead, signs of job 
creation easing are discernible. But it is likely that the pace 
of this variable will suffice to accommodate further 
additions of workers to the labour force and thus hold the 
unemployment rate at historical lows. Other indicators 
Box 1
THE US ECONOMY: FACTORS OF RESILIENCE AND OF VULNERABILITY
SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office, National Bureau of Economic Research, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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also point to the soundness of the labour market in the 
short term, such as the low number of dismissals and the 
high number of employees voluntarily terminating their 
contracts. Moreover, net household wealth has recently hit 
new highs thanks to property and equity price appreciation, 
while the ongoing household debt deleveraging initiated in 
the wake of the financial crisis has taken root. Conversely, 
one factor offering less support to future household 
spending might be the low level of the saving rate which, 
nonetheless, has risen slightly in the most recent phase, 
after reaching historical lows.  
Set against the strength of consumption, business 
investment and the external sector have recently shown 
signs of weakness. If these were to continue in the coming 
quarters, they might feed through to employment and 
consumption dynamics.1 In the case of investment, the 
persistent escalation of trade tensions and the global 
economic slowdown have prompted a worsening of 
business expectations. That has weighed down 
investment, especially in capital goods, an item which has 
been greatly affected by the adverse impact exerted by 
the slowdown in world trade on the manufacturing sector 
(see Chart 1.4). Further, the fall in oil prices is estimated to 
have contributed to the recent sluggishness of investment 
in oil extraction. Aside from these global factors, the 
increase in real labour costs and the reduction in business 
mark-ups might also be negatively affecting the dynamism 
of investment.2 
As to the external sector, the across-the-board weakness 
of world trade and escalating protectionist tensions have 
notably harmed US exports, which is expected to have 
contributed to the worsening observed in the trade and 
current account balance. The current account deficit is, at 
present, close to 3% of GDP. That is around 0.5 pp higher 
than the level prevailing ahead of the start of the global 
trade slowdown and of the application of protectionist 
measures by the Trump administration and which, on IMF 
calculations, is even further off the level that its 
fundamentals would warrant.3 
Taken as a whole, the information available suggests that 
the US economy is already in a more mature phase of the 
cycle while the global economic weakness and some 
persistent sources of uncertainty such as the trade 
tensions might be penalising its dynamism. Yet the 
strength of the determinants of private consumption and, 
in particular, of the labour market would not indicate that 
the recent slowdown in activity were going to step up 
significantly in the short term.4 In this respect, the Federal 
Reserve’s forecasts signal that GDP growth in 2020 (2%) 
will only be slightly down on the rate expected for 2019 
(2.2%).
Tellingly, however, the US economy has, during the current 
expansion, built up certain vulnerabilities that might 
influence the future course of activity. At the same time, 
the space available to apply countercyclical policies is 
currently more limited than in previous cycles. As to the 
vulnerabilities, high corporate debt, especially in the high-
risk segments, is foremost (see Chart 2.1). There are also 
some signs of overvaluation on financial markets, which 
might bear some relation to the search for higher returns 
at the expense of taking on greater risk.5 With regard to 
economic policy leeway, the expansionary budgetary 
measures approved in late 2017 have appreciably dented 
the public finances, in the opinion of the Congressional 
Box 1
THE US ECONOMY: FACTORS OF RESILIENCE AND OF VULNERABILITY (cont’d)
1  Notably, compared with the behaviour of the equipment component, residential investment has picked up somewhat in recent 
months, against a background of lower mortgage interest rates, following the weakening of the attendant outlook that had been 
observed some months back. See, for example, Banco de España (2019), “The  slowdown in the US housing market”, Economic 
Bulletin, 1/2019, Box 3.
2  Using aggregate US data since 1970, Emre (2016) has found that poor business earnings usually precede declines in economic 
activity,	 particularly	 influencing	 investment.	 See	 Emre,	 O.	 (2016).	 “Recession probabilities”. Economic Commentary, Cleveland 
Federal Reserve Bank. 
3  International Monetary Fund (2018). “2018 External sector report: tackling global imbalances amid rising trade tensions”, July.
4  Models based on the US sovereign bond yield curve slope estimate that the probability of the US economy going into recession in 
the coming 12 months would be around 35%. However, the predictive power of these models has been called into question in the 
current setting, since term premia are historically compressed by the effect of the expansionary monetary policies adopted globally. 
See Berganza, J. C., and A. Fuertes (2018). “The flattening of the yield curve in the United States”. Economic Bulletin, Banco de 
España 1/2018.
5  International Monetary Fund (2019). “Global Financial Stability Report: Lower for Longer”, October.
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Budget Office (CBO). This might have reduced the fiscal 
space available to absorb any future adverse shock.6 
Moreover, the fiscal impulse associated with these 
measures will be reversed as from 2020, contributing 
negatively to GDP growth (see Chart 2.2). Also, monetary 
policy room for manoeuvre is more limited than in previous 
cycles owing to interest rates being close to their lower 
effective bound.7 
Box 1
THE US ECONOMY: FACTORS OF RESILIENCE AND OF VULNERABILITY (cont’d)
6	 	Congressional	Budget	Office	(2019).	“The 2019 long-term Budget Outlook”, June.
7  Párraga, S., P. del Río and J. L. Vega (2019). “The Federal Reserve review of its monetary policy framework”, Banco de España, 
Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 4/2019.
SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office and Federal Reserve.
a Loans with a high debt/equity ratio and which entail a high risk of default. EBITDA refers to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation. Quarterly data for 2019.
b Broken lines and shaded bars denote the CBO forecast.
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The global repercussions of economic developments in 
China are increasingly important, given this country’s 
growing weight in the world economy in recent decades 
and its central role in multilateral trade flows (see Chart 1). 
Trade relationships between countries are nowadays 
more complex than a few decades ago, in a setting 
characterised by international fragmentation of production 
through “global value chains”. For instance, the final use 
of Spain’s exports to China, which may incorporate value 
added from third countries, is either to satisfy the domestic 
demand of this Asian country, or else as an input for new 
exports from China to other countries. Likewise, some 
Spanish exports to other countries will be incorporated 
into the production of goods and services that will, in turn, 
ultimately be exported to China. For example, almost half 
of Spain’s exports to the rest of the European Union are 
intermediate goods and services, which are used as 
inputs in the production of other goods and services in 
these countries.
This box explores a particular aspect of the Chinese 
economy’s trade relationship with the euro area and 
Spain: the links through European value chains. For this 
purpose it uses the information contained in world input-
output tables,1 which enables the origin of the value 
added incorporated into the exports from one country to 
another to be traced and broken down by final use. 
Estimates of the impact of a hypothetical slowdown in 
China on the main euro area economies based on this 
approximation are presented.
Chart 2 shows the value added of the euro area, and its 
four main economies, attributable to Chinese domestic 
demand. In the specific case of Spain, this has increased 
significantly in recent years, to stand at 0.9% of GDP in 
2015, up 0.7 percentage points (pp) from 2005. A 
significant part of this link is generated through European 
production chains, since 27% of the Spanish value added 
that satisfies domestic demand in China is incorporated 
into the exports of the rest of the European Union (in 
particular, 8% through German exports). As regards 
Spain’s sectoral exposure, Chinese domestic demand is 
more important for wholesale and retail trade, professional 
services, transport, chemicals and motor vehicles (see 
Chart 3). European value chains are especially important 
in the motor vehicles and machinery sectors. In 
comparative terms, Spain’s link to China in terms of value 
added is half that of the euro area as a whole, and a third 
of that of Germany, which, of the main euro area 
economies, has the strongest relationship with the 
Chinese economy (see Chart 2 again). 
Chart 4 presents some simulations of the impact on the 
value added of the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain, of a hypothetical slowdown in the Chinese 
economy that is sharper than that projected by the main 
analysts, using, again, the information contained in input-
output tables. The main justification for this slowdown is 
linked to the far-reaching and difficult-to-fine-tune 
structural rebalancing currently taking place in this 
economy, resulting from policies to boost private 
consumption relative to investment (with greater import 
content), domestic relative to external demand,2 and 
services relative to industry. Three scenarios approximating 
different aspects of this structural transformation process 
are presented in the chart.3 The first scenario (“no 
rebalancing”) assumes that final demand declines, but 
that its composition remains unchanged, the second 
(“investment rebalancing”) considers that the additional 
slowdown is entirely due to lower investment, while the 
third (“foreign demand rebalancing”) assumes a reduction 
in imports of final goods.
As seen in Chart 4, the largest adverse effect corresponds 
to the third scenario of reduced imports of final products. 
In that case, a fall in Chinese imports equal to 1 pp of GDP 
reduces value added in the euro area by 0.2 pp,4 mainly 
due to the effect on the German economy. The negative 
impact under the second scenario is larger than that 
under the “no-rebalancing” scenario, owing to the higher 
Box 2
THE	IMPACT	OF	THE	CHINESE	ECONOMY	ON	THE	EURO	AREA	AND	SPAIN	THROUGH	EUROPEAN	VALUE	CHAINS
1  See, for example, R. Koopman, Z. Wang and S.-J. Wei (2014), “Tracing Value-Added and Double Counting in Gross Exports”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 104, pp. 459-494. 
2  The foreign value added incorporated into Chinese exports as a percentage of the total exports of this economy, which approximates 
the import content of exports, has fallen by 9 pp since 2005.
3	 	The	magnitude	of	 the	shocks	under	the	three	scenarios	 is	equivalent	 to	1%	of	 the	GDP	of	China.	Specifically,	an	adjustment	 is	
simulated	of	around	USD	100	billion	(1%	of	China’s	GDP	in	2015)	in	final	demand	(first	scenario),	investment	(second	scenario)	and	
imports	of	final	products	(third	scenario).
4  Approximately 10% of the value added associated with euro area exports to China.
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Box 2
THE	IMPACT	OF	THE	CHINESE	ECONOMY	ON	THE	EURO	AREA	AND	SPAIN	THROUGH	EUROPEAN	VALUE	CHAINS	(cont’d)
SOURCES: CEIC, OECD TiVA and own calculations based on WIOD 2016.
Note: Estimation of the spillover effect in an initial round under the assumption that there will be no changes in the productive structure.
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import content of investment than of final demand as a 
whole, and to the specialisation of some euro area 
economies in capital goods. In this respect, at industry 
level, the largest fall would occur in capital goods 
manufacture and, specifically, in machinery, the value 
added of which would fall by 0.5 pp in Spain and by 
almost 2 pp in Germany. The smaller negative impact on 
the Spanish economy under the three simulated scenarios 
is mainly due to the higher weight of its exports of 
consumer goods and services to China, as compared 
with the greater importance of capital goods, in particular, 
in the other countries. 
These simulations, although illustrative, have certain 
limitations, as the approach used focuses exclusively on 
trade relationships. In particular, other channels through 
which the slowdown in China may affect the European 
economies, such as the commodity markets channel, the 
global financial system channel and the channel that operates 
through uncertainty and global confidence, are not analysed.5 
Box 2
THE	IMPACT	OF	THE	CHINESE	ECONOMY	ON	THE	EURO	AREA	AND	SPAIN	THROUGH	EUROPEAN	VALUE	CHAINS	(cont’d)
5  The dynamic effects on productive specialisation and trade composition, and the reaction of prices are not considered either. For 
example, X. Bing, M. Roth and D. Santabárbara (2019), “Impacto global de una desaceleración en China”, Analytical Article, Boletín 
Económico, 4/2019, use the NiGEM global macroeconomic model to simulate a 1 pp fall in Chinese growth considering all the 
above-mentioned	channels	and	find	that	the	overall	impact	on	the	euro	area	economies	would	be	significantly	more	negative	than	
that considered in this box.
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In October, the euro area countries submitted their draft 
budgetary plans for 2020 to the European Commission 
(EC) in fulfilment of their commitments within the European 
economic policy surveillance framework. According to 
these plans, the aggregate euro area budget deficit will 
remain practically unchanged in 2020, at 0.8% of GDP 
(see Chart 1), while public debt will continue to trend 
downwards, falling from 86.4% of GDP in 2019 to 85.1% 
in 2020, assisted by an environment of very low interest 
rates and moderate economic growth.
The draft budgetary plans indicate that the euro area 
aggregate fiscal stance will be slightly expansionary for 
the second consecutive year, so that the area’s structural 
primary deficit will increase by 0.4 percentage points (pp) 
in 2020 (see Charts 2 and 3).1 This stance stems from the 
fiscal policies of the countries that make up the euro area. 
Specifically, as seen in Chart 3, Germany and the 
Netherlands plan to ease their fiscal policies in 2020, as 
they have done in 2019, with a reduction in the primary 
structural surplus of 0.7 and 0.8 pp of their potential GDP, 
respectively. Among the largest economies in the area, 
Italy also proposes to conduct a fiscal expansion. 
Meanwhile, France and Spain foresee a neutral stance, 
with a structural deficit that will remain practically 
unchanged. 
In its initial assessment of these fiscal plans, the EC has 
indicated that eight countries (Belgium, Finland, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain) have a high 
risk of non-compliance with the requirements of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).2 In fact, a majority of the 
countries that are failing to meet their medium-term 
objectives,3 within the framework of the “preventive arm” 
of the SGP, or that are not reducing their high levels of 
debt in accordance with European fiscal rules have 
discontinued the fiscal consolidation required to rebuild 
the necessary budgetary room for manoeuvre.
In this context, the European Fiscal Board (EFB) 
recommended in June a neutral fiscal policy stance for 
the euro area at aggregate level, on the grounds that the 
slowdown in the European economy is temporary and 
output is close to potential. According to this institution, 
the aggregate neutral orientation of budgetary policy 
should be the result of appropriate differences across 
countries, so that those with fiscal space4 should make 
full or partial use of it, while the other countries should 
keep their public finances on a path of improvement in 
line with SGP requirements. 
As detailed above, therefore, the budgetary plans of the 
countries are not necessarily in line with SGP 
requirements or EFB recommendations. Specifically, 
some countries at risk of non-compliance and without 
any fiscal space, such as Italy (see Chart 4), plan to 
conduct a budgetary expansion that would contravene 
EFB recommendations. At the same time, other 
countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, that 
have space available, could conduct a more 
expansionary fiscal policy and still comply with SGP 
requirements and EFB recommendations.
The achievement of an appropriate fiscal policy stance in 
the euro area, resulting from the actions of the individual 
countries based on the principles discussed above, is 
especially important in the current context in which, 
although the accommodative stance of monetary policy 
has been intensified, signs of activity weakness continue 
to be discerned and notable downside risks remain. In 
this respect, in recent months, opinions have been 
expressed in various quarters emphasising the need to 
rebalance the economic policy mix and to consider 
greater fiscal activism at European level, especially in 
view of the risks to economic growth and the low current 
cost of public borrowing.5 In these circumstances, the 
effectiveness of a possible fiscal stimulus in terms of 
Box 3
FISCAL	POLICY	IN	THE	EURO	AREA	IN	2020:	OUTLOOK	AND	ASSESSMENT
1	 	The	primary	structural	balance	is	a	measure	of	the	budgetary	balance	that	reflects	the	discretionary	decisions	of	the	authorities,	since	
it	discounts	both	the	effects	of	the	cycle	on	the	public	finances	and	interest	expense.
2  This assessment is set out in the document on the overall assessment of 2020 budgetary plans. 
3  The medium-term objective of a member country is the structural balance that such country needs to achieve in order to ensure 
compliance	with	the	3%	deficit	target,	taking	into	account	the	need	to	converge	towards	prudent	debt	levels	and	the	future	budgetary	
requirements arising from population ageing.
4	 	Defined	as	the	distance	between	its	structural	balance	and	the	medium-term	objective	(MTO)	of	the	SGP.
5	 	This	 call	 for	 greater	 fiscal	 activism	 has	 grown	 recently.	 See,	 for	 example,	 L.	 de	 Guindos	 (2019),	 “Improving	 macroeconomic	
stabilization in the euro area”, speech at the conference “Global Interdependence Center Central Banking”, Madrid, 3 October. The 
call	for	flexible	use	of	the	SGP	contained	in	the	guidance	addressed	in	September	2019	to	the	Economic	Commissioner	by	the	new	
President of the European Commission should be seen in the same light.
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Box 3
FISCAL	POLICY	IN	THE	EURO	AREA	IN	2020:	OUTLOOK	AND	ASSESSMENT	(cont’d)
SOURCES: European Commission, OECD and own calculations.
a The size of the circles denotes the level of public debt (as a % of GDP). The colour denotes the risk of non-compliance with the SGP: red (risk of 
non-compliance), orange (broadly compliant) and green (compliant).
b Data for Greece and Cyprus not included so as not to distort the picture.
c Expansion of public investment in countries with fiscal space in 2019 if all the fiscal space is used. Own calculations, using the NiGEM Global 
Macroeconomic Model.
d ZLB: zero lower bound (zero nominal interest rates).
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growth could be enhanced, insofar as monetary policy is 
operating at around the effective lower bound on interest 
rates, so that, in principle, rates would not rise in the event 
of a fiscal expansion. 
Among the instruments available, a fiscal policy focused 
on boosting public investment could have a significant 
impact, since this instrument (according to the available 
empirical evidence) has the most potent associated 
multiplier effect and the capacity to generate greater 
effects in the region as a whole and to increase the 
economy’s potential growth.6 The fact that public 
investment has suffered a notable decline since the crisis 
and that its current levels are relatively low in those 
countries that have budgetary room for manoeuvre, 
reinforces the argument in favour of this type of strategy 
(see Chart 5).
However, achieving an improved economic policy mix at 
European level is extraordinarily complex in the current 
institutional framework; fiscal policies are designed at 
national level and there are no mechanisms to help 
internalise the importance of achieving an appropriate 
policy mix at aggregate level, apart from the advisory 
work of the EFB. Consequently, fiscal instruments 
centralised at euro area level need to be designed to 
enable a fiscal policy appropriate for the euro area as a 
whole to be automatically achieved. Certain initiatives 
that attempt to fill part of this institutional gap, such as the 
recently agreed budgetary instrument for convergence 
and competitiveness (BICC)7 and the current European 
investment plan (EFSI)8 should be welcomed. 
In order to illustrate the possible macroeconomic impact 
of a strategy of budgetary expansion within the current 
limits of the European fiscal policy institutional framework, 
Chart 6 presents a simulation exercise performed with the 
NIGEM macro-econometric model.9 Specifically, a 
temporary boost to public investment is considered, 
exclusively in those countries with fiscal space available, 
assuming it is fully utilised in 2020, with a magnitude of 
0.6 pp of GDP for the euro area as a whole.10 Chart 6 
shows two scenarios, one in which there is no monetary 
policy reaction and interest rates remain unchanged, and 
another in which there is a monetary policy reaction in 
accordance with historical patterns, with an increase in 
interest rates to offset the inflationary pressures resulting 
from the fiscal expansion. The results of the simulations 
indicate that an expansionary fiscal policy focused on 
public investment would raise euro area GDP and inflation, 
relative to the baseline scenario. Moreover, these 
estimated impacts would be greater with a monetary 
policy that keeps interest rates unchanged at their lower 
bound. In this case (more in line with the current context), 
the effect on euro area GDP would reach its peak in the 
first year, with an increase in output of up to 0.5 pp above 
its baseline level, and slowly fade thereafter.11, 12  The 
effect on inflation, in contrast, would be greatest in the 
second year, when the rate would stand 0.25 pp above its 
baseline level.
Box 3
FISCAL	POLICY	IN	THE	EURO	AREA	IN	2020:	OUTLOOK	AND	ASSESSMENT	(cont’d)
6	 	See,	 inter-alia,	Banco	de	España	(2017),	Annual	Report	2016,	Chapter	4,	“fiscal	policy	 in	the	euro	area”;	Ó.	Arce,	S.	Hurtado	and	
C. Thomas	(2016),	“Policy	spillovers	and	synergies	in	a	monetary	union”,	ECB	WP	1942,	August;	V.	A.	Ramey	(2019),	“Ten	years	after	
the	financial	crises:	what	have	we	learned	from	the	renaissance	in	fiscal	research?”,	NBER	WP	25531;	M.	Alloza,	P.	Burriel,	J.	J.	Pérez	
(2019),	 “Fiscal	 policies	 in	 the	 euro	 area:	 revisiting	 the	 size	 of	 spillovers”,	 Journal	 of	 Macroeconomics,	 forthcoming;	 M.	 Alloza,	
B. Cozmanca,	M.	Ferdinandusse	and	P.	Jacquinot	(2019),	“Fiscal	spillovers	in	a	monetary	union”,	ECB	Economic	Bulletin,	Issue	1/2019.
7  For an explanation of this instrument, see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/emu-deepening/bicc-faq.
8	 	Although	the	EFSI	has	mobilised	a	significant	amount	of	investment,	the	European	Court	of	auditors	has	concluded	that	for	some	of	
the	 projects	 financed,	 EFSI	 support	 just	 replaced	 other	 financing	 (see	 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/NewsItem.
aspx?nid=9010).
9  The NiGEM model is built by the UK National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The model documentation is available at 
https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/.
10	 	Specifically,	the	fiscal	stimuli	of	Germany	(with	a	figure	close	to	1.9%	of	potential	GDP),	the	Netherlands	(1%)	and	Austria	(0.3%)	
would stand out.    
11	 	According	to	this	model,	the	spillover	effects	of	this	fiscal	stimulus	on	the	GDP	of	the	large	economies	of	the	euro	area,	such	as	
Spain, Italy and France, are positive, although moderate, amounting to around 0.2 pp of GDP, with respect to the baseline scenario. 
12  In line with the empirical evidence, the effects associated with an increase in public investment would be greater, especially in the 
medium	 term,	 than	 those	 obtained	 by	 simulating	 a	 fiscal	 stimulus	 through	 government	 consumption.	 In	 this	 case,	 with	 an	
accommodative	monetary	policy,	euro	area	GDP	would	stand	0.4	pp	higher	than	its	baseline	level	in	the	first	year,	but	this	effect	
would subsequently fade much more quickly than in the case of a public investment stimulus.
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At its 12 September meeting, the ECB Governing Council 
adopted a series of monetary policy measures aimed at 
increasing the degree of monetary accommodation in the 
euro area.1 Three months earlier, in a speech in Sintra2 
(Portugal) on 18 June, the ECB President had already 
advanced the central bank’s readiness to adopt additional 
stimulus measures, such as cuts in the policy interest rate 
or a restart of the asset purchase programme. 
Taking this last date as a reference, this box analyses how 
financial conditions in the Spanish economy have changed 
in recent months, to assess the extent to which they have 
been affected by the latest monetary policy decisions and 
by the ECB’s communication in the months leading up to 
those decisions.3 Specifically, the box examines how the 
cost of financing has changed for the public sector, 
households and non-financial corporations, both for new 
lending and outstanding amounts. The macroeconomic 
implications differ: while a decline in the cost of new 
lending is relevant for expenditure decisions that rely on 
obtaining borrowed funds, a fall in the cost of outstanding 
debt boosts the purchasing power of indebted agents as 
it eases their debt burden.
After ECB President Draghi’s speech at the annual central 
banking forum in Sintra, the investor perception that the 
low interest rate scenario would continue for some time 
was reinforced. The financial markets began to expect 
new monetary stimulus measures, giving rise, from then 
on, to declines in interbank market rates at the different 
maturities (although it is difficult to discern which part of 
the changes observed is a direct consequence of 
monetary easing and which is due to other factors).
As Chart 1 shows, from 18 June 3-month EURIBOR fell by 
13  bp to a new all-time low of -0.45% at the start of 
September, and then recovered slightly. At the start of 
December it stood at -0.39%, which is a cumulative drop 
of 7 bp since 18 June (similar in scale to the 10 bp cut in 
the ECB deposit facility following the September meeting). 
12-month EURIBOR, which is the main variable rate 
mortgage loan reference index in Spain, records a 
cumulative fall of 9 bp. For their part, long-term interest 
rates had been falling since October 2018, as a 
consequence of the worsening economic outlook and the 
weakening inflation expectations in the euro area. Since 
the Sintra meeting to date, the 10-year swap rate records 
a cumulative decline of 10 bp.4, 5
The fall in interbank market rates has passed through to 
the government and corporate debt markets, resulting in 
further declines in the cost of funding via debt securities 
for general government and non-financial corporations 
(which costs had been falling since the start of the year). 
Between 18 June and 10 December, the Spanish 10-year 
government bond yield fell by 2 bp, while the issue price 
of non-financial corporations’ 10-year debt securities fell 
by 23 bp (see Chart 2). At 10 December, these financing 
costs stood at 0.46% and 1.54%, respectively, both of 
which are extraordinarily low levels from an historical 
standpoint.
Interest rates on new bank lending in Spain have also 
fallen in most segments, down to very depressed levels 
close to their all-time lows. As Chart 3 shows, between 
June and October the cost of new loans extended to 
households for house purchase and, albeit to a lesser 
extent, of new consumer credit fell, by 26 bp to 1.82% 
and by 13 bp to 7.14%, respectively (in both cases, 
seasonally-adjusted). In the case of non-financial 
corporations, financing costs only decreased (by 5 bp) for 
loans over €1 million, with interest rates at 1.40% in 
October. By contrast, the cost of smaller loans granted to 
firms rose slightly. 
Box 4
CHANGES	IN	FINANCIAL	CONDITIONS	IN	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	IN	VIEW	OF	THE	ECB’S	COMMUNICATION 
AND DECISIONS IN RECENT MONTHS
1	 	These	measures	notably	included	the	10 bp	cut	in	the	deposit	facility	rate,	the	strengthening	of	forward	guidance	and	the	restart	of	
net asset purchases. For more details, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ecb.mp190912~08de50b4d2.
en.html.
2  See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190618~ec4cd2443b.en.html.
3  In addition to the Sintra speech, another important milestone in the ECB’s communication on the imminent adoption of stimulus 
measures was the Governing Council meeting on 25 July when the ECB announced its willingness to adjust all of its instruments to 
achieve	its	inflation	aim.
4  Swap rates approximately capture investor expectations of future moves in 3-month interbank market rates, measured in the case 
of the euro area through the EURIBOR index.
5	 	In	mid-August	the	fall	was	53 bp.	The	subsequent	 increase	 in	these	 interest	rates	 is	possibly	on	account	of	a	certain	degree	of	
steadying of the economic outlook compared with the deterioration observed earlier.
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The latest monetary policy decisions have also helped 
drive down the cost of the outstanding debt of the different 
institutional sectors. In the case of general government, 
the interest rate on outstanding debt has decreased by 
14  bp, down to 2.21% in October (see Chart  4). In the 
case of bank debt of households and firms, interest rates 
on outstanding debt have fallen slightly, by 3 bp to 2.60% 
and by 1 bp to 1.82%, respectively. 
The changes in the cost of financing described are 
consistent with the impact to be expected of the various 
monetary policy decisions adopted and announcements 
made. But a degree of caution is required, since it is not 
possible to establish an exact link between the 
announcements and decisions and the changes 
observed. These will most likely have also been 
influenced by a variety of other factors pulling in different 
directions, such as macroeconomic developments, 
further monetary easing in the United States or the 
latest developments in the US-China trade conflict or in 
the outlook on Brexit.
Box 4
CHANGES	IN	FINANCIAL	CONDITIONS	IN	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	IN	VIEW	OF	THE	ECB’S	COMMUNICATION 
AND DECISIONS IN RECENT MONTHS (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España and Bloomberg Data License.
a Cyclical trend component of interest rates in new lending (irregular component and seasonally adjusted).
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On 29 November, the ECB published the results of the 
21st round of the Survey on the Access to Finance of 
Enterprises (SAFE) in the euro area, which covers the 
period from April to September 2019. The surveyed 
enterprises, essentially small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), were asked about the trends over the 
previous six months in their economic and financial 
situation, their external financing requirements and the 
terms and conditions on which such financing had, or had 
not, been obtained.
In the case of Spanish SMEs, the data of this latest edition 
of the survey show, overall, a certain intensification of the 
less favourable trends already apparent in their economic 
and financial situation six months ago. Thus, although the 
number of enterprises reporting higher turnover again 
exceeded the number reporting lower turnover, the 
difference between these two groups (net percentage) fell 
for the second consecutive time, to 15%, five percentage 
points less than the difference in the previous survey and 
the difference for the euro area as a whole (see Chart 1). 
Labour and other costs continued to increase for a high 
net proportion of the surveyed SMEs (50% and 51%, 
respectively, as compared with 50% and 53% in the euro 
area as a whole). As a result profits performed less 
favourably than turnover. Specifically, as in the previous 
round, the percentage of enterprises reporting increases 
in profits was lower than that reporting decreases, with a 
net negative percentage of -7%, as against -4% in the 
previous round, and -1% for the euro area as a whole. The 
sector breakdown shows that the less favourable turnover 
developments affected almost all sectors, trade being the 
one with the lowest proportion of enterprises reporting an 
increase in turnover (7%, in net terms, down six percentage 
points from the previous round). In the case of profits, 
trade was also the sector in which the largest number of 
SMEs reported a decline (20%, in net terms). In 
construction and services, the number of SMEs reporting 
a fall in profit also exceeded the number reporting an 
increase, but the difference between these two groups 
was more moderate (5% and 1% respectively).
When asked about their dominant concern, the difficulty 
of finding customers was the one indicated by the 
largest percentage of Spanish SMEs (25%, see Chart 2), 
while in the euro area as a whole, the problem mentioned 
most frequently was, for the fourth consecutive time, 
the availability of skilled labour (28%). In contrast, 
access to finance was again, of all the factors included 
in this question, the one mentioned by the smallest 
number of companies (8% in Spain and 7% in the euro 
area, very similar percentages to those recorded six 
months earlier). 
In this setting, the proportion of Spanish SMEs applying 
for bank loans rose by 2 pp, to 31% (see Chart 3). This is 
higher than the figure for the euro area (26%), and yet 
remains close to the lower values observed in recent 
years. In turn, access to bank loans continued to improve, 
although at an increasingly slower pace (see Chart  4). 
Thus, in net terms, 11% of Spanish SMEs reported an 
improvement in this respect, 5 pp less than in the previous 
survey round and just 1 pp more than the figure recorded 
for their euro area peers with which they have gradually 
converged over the last two years. The enterprises 
surveyed observed different changes in the factors 
affecting the supply of credit, but they all recorded less 
favourable figures than in the previous round. Specifically, 
in net terms, 12% of Spanish SMEs perceived a greater 
willingness of banks to provide credit (this figure is 9 pp 
lower than that recorded six months earlier) and 7% 
signalled a favourable impact associated with their credit 
history (6  pp lower than in the last survey round). By 
contrast, the percentage of SMEs that reported a 
deterioration in their specific situation was higher – albeit 
only slightly (2  pp) – than that reporting the opposite 
(something not seen since June 2013), compared with 
the 13% net that reported an improvement in the last 
survey round. In addition, almost 26% perceived an 
adverse change in the general economic outlook 
(compared with 8% net in the immediately preceding 
period).
The percentage of SMEs whose loan applications were 
rejected fell slightly, by 1 pp, to 4%, a little lower than the 
figure for the euro area overall (6%). Moreover, the broad 
indicator of financing obstacles for bank loans1 improved 
somewhat, with a decline of 1 pp in the proportion of firms 
Box 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPANISH SMEs’	ACCESS	TO	EXTERNAL	FINANCE	ACCORDING	TO	THE	ECB’s 
SIX-MONTHLY SURVEY
1	 	This	indicator	reflects	enterprises	in	any	of	the	following	situations:	those	whose	applications	for	funds	were	rejected;	those	that	were	
granted	funds	but	only	in	a	limited	amount;	those	that	were	granted	the	loan	requested	but	at	a	cost	they	considered	too	high;	and	
those	that	did	not	apply	for	finance	for	fear	of	rejection	(discouraged	borrowers).
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Box 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPANISH SMEs’	ACCESS	TO	EXTERNAL	FINANCE	ACCORDING	TO	THE	ECB’s 
SIX-MONTHLY SURVEY (cont’d)
SOURCE: ECB.
a Percentage of firms that report an increase minus the percentage that report a decrease.
b Percentage of firms that report an improvement minus the percentage that report a deterioration.
c This indicator reflects the proportion of firms in any of the following situations: those whose applications for funds were rejected; those that were 
granted funds but only in a limited amount; those that were granted the loan requested but at a cost they considered too high; and those that did 
not apply for finance for fear of rejection (discouraged borrowers). The numbers on the horizontal axis denote the survey rounds, with 1 being the 
period from October 2015 to March 2016 and 8 the period from April to September 2019.
d Percentage of firms that report an improvement in conditions (fall in interest rates, increase in loan size and maturity, and decrease in collateral and 
other requirements) minus the percentage that report a deterioration in these conditions.
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facing such obstacles, down to 7%, virtually the same as 
for the euro area (see Chart 5).
Regarding financing conditions, the percentage of firms 
reporting an increase in interest rates was higher, by 2 pp, 
than that reporting a decline, for the first time since 2014, 
compared with the last survey round where the opposite was 
the case (with a difference of 1% between the two groups; 
see Chart  6). Firms also reported a tightening of collateral 
requirements and of other loan terms and conditions (other 
than size and maturity). But the net proportion of firms that 
reported an increase both in the size of loans (10%, compared 
with 7% in the last round) and maturities available (8%, 2 pp 
less than six months earlier) remained positive. 
To sum up, the latest round of the SAFE shows that 
between April and September 2019, access to bank loans 
for Spanish SMEs continued to improve, albeit at an 
increasingly moderate pace, in a setting in which, for the 
second consecutive time, their economic and financial 
situation showed signs of some deterioration. Spanish 
SMEs’ survey responses also reflected that they expected 
little change in their access to bank loans in the period 
from October 2019 to March 2020.
Box 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPANISH SMEs’	ACCESS	TO	EXTERNAL	FINANCE	ACCORDING	TO	THE	ECB’s 
SIX-MONTHLY SURVEY (cont’d)
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In recent years the strength of private consumption has 
been one of the main drivers of the current expansionary 
phase of the Spanish economy. Thus, despite its recent 
slowdown, since 2014 the rate of growth of this demand 
component has, in annual average terms, been above 
2%. Consequently, in real terms its level has gradually 
converged towards that observed before the crisis. This 
recovery of consumption seems to be closely linked to the 
favourable behaviour of the labour market over these 
years and, in particular, to job creation and the attendant 
increase in income. 
This box uses microdata from the Household Budget 
Survey to analyse the impact that the behaviour of 
employment has had on household spending, measured 
in nominal terms, over the current economic cycle. To this 
end, it analyses the change in nominal consumption of 
three household groups over the period from 2007 to 
2018, as a function of whether the number of employed 
members of the household decreases, increases or 
remains unchanged for two consecutive years.1 The third 
of these groups is the most numerous one, and its weight 
in the sample has risen since the crisis to nearly 82%. 
Also, consumer spending is divided into four categories of 
goods and services: (i)  staple goods and those whose 
level of consumption cannot be easily adjusted downward 
by households, (ii)  non-essential non-durable goods, 
(iii) durable goods and (iv) services.2
During the crisis, households adjusted their spending in 
response to the higher uncertainty, a worsening labour 
market and tighter financial conditions. Based on the 
microdata used in this Box, as shown by Chart 1.1, 
spending by households in which the number of employed 
members did not change at the beginning of the crisis 
(and whose income was therefore not directly affected a 
priori by the job destruction in these years) began to show 
much more moderate growth rates than those of their 
income even before the crisis began. Moreover, once the 
recession began, consumption (particularly of durable 
goods) contracted more sharply than income.3 This 
probably reflected the increase in precautionary saving by 
these households, which, against a background of rising 
unemployment, presumably perceived a higher likelihood 
of job loss.4
Spending levels fell much more sharply in the households 
in which one or more members lost their job (see 
Chart 1.2), which was nearly 15% of them in 2009. The fall 
in this group’s consumption was, in any event, more 
contained than that in its income, probably as a result of a 
desire to smooth the fluctuations in its spending on goods 
and services over time in the face of falls in income which, 
although sharp and possibly persistent, may be perceived 
as temporary.
Subsequently, the recovery of the labour market, along 
with lower uncertainty, readier access to credit and 
favourable financing conditions, has subsequently been a 
major driver of the recovery of consumption via two 
channels. First, the reduction in the flow of workers from 
employment to unemployment appears to have lowered 
households’ perceived likelihood of becoming unemployed, 
therefore reducing the need for precautionary saving. 
Thus, the consumption of households in which the number 
of employed members held unchanged seems to have 
grown even slightly more quickly than their income 
between 2014 and 2017, in contrast with the behaviour of 
Box 6
THE	RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	THE	BEHAVIOUR	OF	CONSUMPTION	AND	EMPLOYMENT	DURING	THE	RECOVERY
1	 	The	characteristics	of	the	data	used	allow	information	on	a	specific	household	to	be	obtained	only	for	periods	of	two	consecutive	
years, but not for longer periods.
2	 	These	four	categories	correspond	to	the	following	types	of	goods	and	services:	i) staple	goods	are	food	and	non-alcoholic	beverages,	
and pharmaceutical and medical products, and non-adjustable goods are rent paid or imputed (in the case of owner-occupiers) for 
the	principle	residence	and	the	current	expenses	associated	with	its	maintenance	and	utilities;	ii) non-essential	non-durable	goods	
comprise	alcoholic	beverages,	tobacco,	personal	care	and	petrol;	iii) durable	goods	include	clothes,	footware,	furniture,	vehicles,	
telephones,	 leisure	articles,	gardening	apparel	and	pets;	and	 iv) services	comprise,	 inter	alia,	spending	on	transport,	education,	
health, telephones, recreational and cultural services, hotels and restaurants, personal care, insurance, domestic service, and repair 
of furniture and vehicles.
3	 	For	an	analysis	of	consumer	behaviour	by	product	type	and	household	during	the	crisis	and	the	first	few	years	of	the	recovery,	see	
M. Martínez Matute and A. Urtasun (2017), The recovery of private consumption in Spain by product type and household, Banco de 
España, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017.
4  For an analysis of the contribution of different household groups to the aggregate saving rate between 2007 and 2016, see A. 
Brindhusa, C. Barceló and E. Villanueva (2019), The saving rate in Spain between 2007 and 2016: decomposition by population 
group and possible determinants, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin, 4/2019, Banco de España.
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previous years. Moreover, the prospects of finding work 
for households with unemployed members improved in 
that period. In households in which the number of members 
in work decreased between 2014 and 2017, this was 
presumably conducive to the fall in their spending being 
proportionately less relative to the decline in income than 
in the crisis years, suggesting that, compared with that 
period, they had revised their permanent income 
expectations downwards less sharply. 
Second, improvements in the labour market during the 
recovery period (that is, from 2014 to 2017) raised the 
proportion of households in which there was an increase 
in the number of employed members, and therefore, 
whose income increased significantly. In this group, 
spending on both durable goods and services grew 
notably in those years (see Chart 1.3). In fact, although 
these households account for a relatively low proportion 
of total households (around 10%), their spending on 
Box 6
THE	RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	THE	BEHAVIOUR	OF	CONSUMPTION	AND	EMPLOYMENT	DURING	THE	RECOVERY	(cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España calculations.
a Staple goods: food and non-alcoholic beverages, and pharmaceutical and medical products. Non-adjustable goods: rent paid or imputed (in the 
case of owner-occupiers) for the principle residence and the current expenses associated with its maintenance, repair and utilities. Non-essential 
non-durable goods: alcoholic beverages, tobacco, personal care and petrol. Durable goods: clothes, footware, furniture, vehicles, telephones, 
leisure articles, gardening apparel and pets. Services: spending on transport, education, health, post, telephones and fax, recreational and cultural 
services, hotels and restaurants, personal care, social protection services, insurance, financial and remittance services, domestic service, furniture 
installation and repair, and vehicle repair and parking.
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durable goods largely explains the upturn in spending 
on such goods by Spanish households overall during 
that period (see Chart 1.4), their contribution being 
somewhat higher than that of households in which the 
number of employed members did not vary (although 
these represent a far higher proportion of the total). In 
this latter group, spending on durable goods grew 
moderately, but not sufficiently, in terms of spending by 
household, to offset the significant decline during the 
crisis. 
However, the consumption patterns in 2018 seem to differ 
somewhat from those of the early years of the expansion. 
That year, income growth outpaced that of consumption 
(except for households in which the number of people in 
work fell), with a particularly notable moderation of the 
dynamism of spending on durable goods and services. 
This probably reflects the progressive absorption of the 
demand for durable goods accumulated during the crisis 
along with the perception by households of heightened 
uncertainty regarding the economic outlook.
Box 6
THE	RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	THE	BEHAVIOUR	OF	CONSUMPTION	AND	EMPLOYMENT	DURING	THE	RECOVERY	(cont’d)
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In September, coinciding with the release of the 2019 Q2 
data, the Banco de España published a benchmark 
revision of the Balance of Payments and International 
Investment Position (BOP/IIP). This revision was 
coordinated with the revision of the National Accounts by 
the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) and the 
revision of the Financial Accounts also released by the 
Banco de España. The changes made enhanced the 
quality of the statistics that measure Spain’s financial and 
non-financial linkages with the rest of the world, making 
them better adapted to international standards and more 
consistent with each other.
Implications for economic analysis
Compared with the previous series, the new data available 
point to an improvement in the Spanish economy’s net 
lending position and a modest increase in the negative net 
IIP.
Indeed, the historical series of the Spanish economy’s net 
lending/net borrowing position was revised. The revision 
– downward at the start of the period (the second half of 
the 1990s) and upward at the end – was most significant 
from 2013: around 0.5% of GDP in 2013 and 1% at the 
end of the period (see Chart 1). The headings that explain 
Box 7
2019	BALANCE	OF	PAYMENTS/IIP	AND	NATIONAL	ACCOUNTS	BENCHMARK	REVISION:	METHODOLOGICAL	ASPECTS	
AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
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this revision are primarily travel, and more recently, albeit 
to a lesser extent, also goods, other travel services and 
investment income.1 The new series of net lending/net 
borrowing of the Spanish economy confirms that, for the 
first time in recent history, the economy is recording 
significant current account surpluses over a prolonged 
upturn. The current figures reinforce the view that not only 
cyclical but also other more long-term factors explain the 
improvement in the external balance which is essential if 
progress is to be made to correct Spain’s high net debt 
position with the rest of the world.2
The upward revision of the travel surplus, essentially 
owing to receipts, explains slightly more than half the total 
revision of the net lending position since 2015. It increases 
over the time series, up to more than €6 billion in 2018 
(around 0.6% of GDP) (see Chart  2). In that year, with 
travel receipts of €69  billion, Spain consolidated its 
second place in the world ranking.3
The revision of the travel receipts heading was due to the 
inclusion of the level of tourism expenditure drawing on 
the Spanish Tourism Expenditure Survey (EGATUR), rather 
than the previous approximation that used only the 
survey’s growth rates. The changes in the estimation of 
travel receipts in the BOP and their relationship with 
certain National Accounts headings and with tourism 
expenditure in the EGATUR survey are described in more 
detail in a specific statistical note.4
In the case of the net IIP, the benchmark revision has had 
a moderate impact. The effect was practically zero in the 
early years of the series, and then turned negative in the 
period 2001-2011 (3.1% of GDP on average) and positive 
between 2012 and 2016 (1.6% of GDP on average) (see 
Chart  3). More recently (2017‑2018) the impact turned 
negative again, with the 2018 IIP being revised to ‑80.4% 
of GDP, from ‑77.4% of GDP previously estimated.
The main contributors to the IIP revision were changes in 
direct investment and, within that heading, investment in 
real estate, and specifically properties in Spain whose 
current series better reflects developments in real estate 
prices (see Chart  4).5 However, this heading is a good 
example of liability components of the IIP that do not 
entail a definite future payment obligation, which must be 
taken into account when analysing the real degree of 
external vulnerability that external debt poses for the 
economy.
Consistent and complementary statistics
These changes to the BOP/IIP were likewise reflected in 
the rest of the world accounts in both the National 
Accounts and the Financial Accounts, thus achieving 
significant progress in making all these statistics more 
consistent. 
The first step in this direction was taken in 2014 with the 
implementation in Europe of the new National Accounts 
and BOP/IIP manuals – ESA 2010 and BPM6, respectively 
– which harmonised the methodology used in the two sets 
of statistics. In Spain, greater coordination was established 
between the teams responsible for drawing up the rest of 
the world account in the National Accounts (INE) and in the 
Financial Accounts and the BOP/IIP (the Banco de España 
in both cases). The objective was to ensure that, thanks to 
harmonisation of the interpretation and of the sources and 
methods used in practice, this consistency between the 
methodological manuals translated into the greatest 
possible consistency in the numerical results. This aim 
was achieved with the 2019 benchmark revision. Following 
release of the new results for the entire time series, the 
differences between equivalent concepts of the National 
Accounts rest of the world account and the BOP are non-
existent (on the non-financial side, the current and capital 
accounts) and minimal (on the financial side).
Box 7
2019 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS/IIP AND NATIONAL ACCOUNTS BENCHMARK REVISION: METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
1  For a more detailed analysis, see “Impact of the 2019 benchmark revision on the net lending/net borrowing and international 
investment position of the Spanish economy”, Notas Estadísticas No. 10, Banco de España. 
2  See “Current account adjustment”, Chapter 3, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España. 
3  According to the World Tourism Organization, the United States topped the ranking with €181.6 billion and France held third place 
with €55.5 billion.
4  See “The estimation of travel credits in the balance of payments”, Notas Estadísticas No. 11, Banco de España.
5  For more details, see “Impact of the 2019 benchmark revision on the net lending/net borrowing and international investment position 
of the Spanish economy”, Notas Estadísticas No. 10, Banco de España.
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However, there are still differences in presentation 
between the two sets of statistics that users should be 
aware of. In this respect, the main difference is that, since 
the BOP/IIP is drawn up from the standpoint of resident 
agents and the National Accounts from the standpoint of 
the rest of the world, payments (receipts) in the BOP are 
stated as resources (uses) in the National Accounts. In 
consequence, net lending/net borrowing in the BOP has 
the same value as the corresponding heading in the 
National Accounts for the total economy, but with the 
Box 7
2019	BALANCE	OF	PAYMENTS/IIP	AND	NATIONAL	ACCOUNTS	BENCHMARK	REVISION:	METHODOLOGICAL	ASPECTS	
AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
Balance of Payments
Goods and services
secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE6.PsdooG    
secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI7.PsecivreS    
    Travel B.11 External balance on goods and services
    Non-travel services
    Manufacturing and maintenance and repair services
    Transport
    Construction
    Insurance and pension services
    Financial services
    Charges for use of intellectual property
    Telecommunications, computer and information services
    Other business services
    Personal, cultural and recreational services and government 
    goods and services
Primary income
seeyolpme fo noitasnepmoC1.D  
emocni ytreporP4.Democni tnemtsevnI    
tseretnIyrogetac lanoitcnuf yB    
snoitaroproc fo emocni detubirtsiDtnemtsevni tceriD    
sgninrae detsevnieRtnemtsevni oiloftroP    
emocni tnemtsevni rehtOtnemtsevni rehtO    
    Reserve assets
    By institutional sector
stropmi dna noitcudorp no sexaT2.Democni yramirp rehtO    
D.3 Subsidies
Secondary income
.cte ,htlaew ,emocni no sexat tnerruC5.Dtnemnrevog lareneG    
snoitubirtnoc laicos teN16.Dsrotces rehtO    
dnik ni srefsnart laicos naht rehto stifeneb laicoS26.Dsecnattimer 'srekroW    
D.7 Other current transfers
ecnalab tnerruC21.Btnuocca tnerruC
Capital account
D.9 Capital transfers, receivable/payable
NP Acquisitions less disposals of non-produced assets
)–( gniworrob ten/)+( gnidnel teN9.Btnuocca latipac dna tnerruC
Spanish Quarterly National Accounts Quarterly non-financial
accounts of rest of the world sectors (S.2)
Table 1
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND NON-FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS SECTOR HEADINGS
seeyolpme fo noitasnepmoC
external
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 4/2019  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
opposite sign. Table 1 shows the relationship between the 
BOP and National Accounts components.
Regarding transactions in goods and services, for services 
the BOP has a greater level of detail than the National 
Accounts. Moreover, for the specific case of goods and 
services acquired by tourists/travellers, the BOP has a 
specific heading (Travel), whereas in the National Accounts 
this expenditure is assigned to various components. It is 
mainly recorded as consumption or spending of (non-) 
residents (within) outside the economic territory, but also, 
in a smaller proportion, as intermediate consumption 
(expenditure on business travel (travel and subsistence 
expenses)) or other services (expenditure on package 
holidays arranged through intermediaries).
In the case of financial balances and transactions, in the 
BOP/IIP the functional category is the first level of 
classification, which is then subdivided into instruments 
and institutional sectors. By contrast, the National 
Accounts use the instrument and sector directly. Table 2 
illustrates the relationship between the BOP/IIP’s 
functional categories and instruments. These relationships 
allow users to complement the data offered by the 
National Accounts with the BOP/IIP, or vice versa, with 
total guarantee of consistency.
Box 7
2019	BALANCE	OF	PAYMENTS/IIP	AND	NATIONAL	ACCOUNTS	BENCHMARK	REVISION:	METHODOLOGICAL	ASPECTS	
AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
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In early 2018, global economic activity began clearly to 
slow. This slowdown has been manifest essentially in a 
marked worsening in international trade and manufacturing 
activity indicators, but also in a certain loss of momentum 
in the services sector. Given the relatively sizeable weight 
of manufactures in global trade, the comparatively greater 
loss of buoyancy in the sector is consistent with the 
increase in trade tensions observed in this period. Thus, in 
the euro area for instance, gross value added in the 
manufacturing industry, after having posted a year-on-
year growth rate of over 4% in early 2018, has shrunk to a 
rate of close to 1% in 2019 Q2. The same variable in the 
services sector has only fallen by 1 pp, from 3% to 2%, 
over this period (see Chart 1). A wide range of indicators 
suggests that, in the Spanish economy, the manufacturing 
sector has in recent quarters also trended less favourably 
than the services sectors (see Chart 2 and 3.1). 
The production of any good or service is characterised by 
increasingly complex customer-supplier relationships 
across the different sectors of the economy. In this 
connection, this box analyses to what extent the recent 
slowdown in services in the Spanish economy is related 
to the more marked weakness witnessed in the 
manufacturing industry. To conduct this analysis we use 
the world input-output tables (WIOD), which offer detailed 
information on the uses and destinations of production for 
a broad set of countries and sectors.1 This information 
enables the “manufacturing orientation” of each of the 
sub-sectors of activity under services to be calculated, 
proxied by the proportion of their invoicing intended for 
the manufacturing sector.2 This measure thus reflects the 
sensitivity of each of the services sub-sectors to a 
downturn in industrial activity.  
In aggregate terms, the manufacturing orientation of 
services in the Spanish economy stands at around 8%, 
below the related figures observed in Germany and Italy, it 
is in line with the level of manufacturing exposure recorded 
in the French services sector (see Chart 4.1). As to the 
geographical source of this exposure, the invoicing of the 
Spanish services sector stemming from foreign 
Box 8
THE RECENT SLOWDOWN IN ACTIVITY FROM A SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE
SOURCES: CPB and Eurostat.
a CPB. Latest observation: September.
b Eurostat. Latest observation: June.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SLOWDOWN IN MANUFACTURING
1  For more details on this database, see Timmer, M., E. Dietzenbacher, B. Los, R. Stehrer and G. de Vries (2015) “An Illustrated User 
Guide to the World Input–Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive Production”, Review of International Economics, 23.
2  Note that this proportion includes not only the direct invoicing of services to manufacturing but also the indirect exposure through 
third sectors that act as services customers and manufacturing suppliers. 
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manufacturing industry is relatively small. Aside from 
these aggregate figures, there is high heterogeneity 
across the different services sub-sectors. Hence, whereas 
land transport and wholesale trade-related services 
evidence a manufacturing orientation of over 20%, this 
measure is below 2% for the R+D, human health activities 
and accommodation and food service activities sub-
sectors (see Chart 5.1). Also, although the exposure of 
services to foreign manufacturing industry is limited in 
aggregate terms, in the case of the maritime transport and 
air transport sub-sectors this exposure is as or more 
significant than that to domestic industry. 
Box 8
THE RECENT SLOWDOWN IN ACTIVITY FROM A SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE (cont’d)
SOURCE: INE.
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On the basis of the manufacturing orientation of the various 
services sub-sectors, it is possible to assess to what extent 
the recent slowdown in services activity may have been 
linked to the deceleration in the manufacturing sector. In 
particular, the loss of momentum is expected to have been 
potentially sharper in those services sub-sectors with a 
greater manufacturing orientation. Indeed, when changes in 
the activity of the services sub-sectors are proxied by the 
change in the average year-on-year rate of job creation from 
2018 to 2019 (in terms of Social Security registrations),3 a 
negative relationship is observed between the manufacturing 
orientation of services and the degree of dynamism of 
services activity (see Chart 6.1).4 A simple linear regression 
model confirms that this association is not only statistically 
significant but also economically relevant. In particular, the 
estimated relationship suggests that, for each percentage 
point of services sector invoicing from the manufacturing 
sector, the slowdown in the latter would have reduced the 
pace of job creation in the services sub-sectors by 0.06 pp, 
on average. 
In the specific case of the car industry, which plays a most 
significant role in the Spanish economy and, in particular, 
in terms of its export capacity, some loss of momentum 
has been witnessed since the start of 2018. However, this 
diminished dynamism is much less acute than that in 
Germany, for example (see Chart 3.2). In aggregate terms, 
the percentage of sales of Spanish services intended for 
the motor vehicle manufacturing sector (which might be 
called “car orientation”) is in line with what is observable 
in France and Italy, but is far behind the related figures for 
German services (see Chart 4.2). Further, as in the case of 
manufacturing orientation, there is high heterogeneity 
within services as regards exposure to the car sector. 
Hence, while services associated with the sale of motor 
vehicles show an orientation above 5% and advertising 
and engineering services evidence orientations close to 
2%, accommodation and food and R+D-related services 
show exposures to the car sector close to zero (see Chart 
5.2). Once again, resorting to this heterogeneity, it is 
possible to estimate a negative correlation between the 
car orientation of each services sub-sector and the 
change between 2018 and 2019 in the attendant average 
year-on-year rate of job creation (see Chart 6.2).5 This 
statistically significant correlation means that, for each 
Box 8
THE RECENT SLOWDOWN IN ACTIVITY FROM A SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España calculations based on WIOD 2016.
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3  The rate for 2019 refers to the January-October period compared with the same months of the previous year.
4	 	The	 number	 of	 Social	 Security	 registrations	 is	 used	 because	 it	 is	 the	 sole	 high-frequency	 indicator	 available	 with	 a	 sufficient	
breakdown by services sector. 
5  See footnote 3.
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percentage point of services sector invoicing from the car 
sector, the slowdown in the latter is expected to have 
reduced, on average, the rate of job creation in the related 
services activities by 0.4 pp. 
In conclusion, according to the analysis set out in this 
box, a significant portion of the slowdown in services 
since early 2018 is estimated to be linked to the sharper 
slowdown in manufacturing. Moreover, the fact that the 
Box 8
THE RECENT SLOWDOWN IN ACTIVITY FROM A SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España calculations based on WIOD 2016.
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Spanish services sector’s exposure to industry, in general, 
and to the car sector, in particular, is less than that 
observed in Germany (and, to a lesser extent, Italy), has 
contributed to the knock-on effect from manufacturing on 
the economy as a whole proving comparatively less acute 
in Spain’s case.
Box 8
THE RECENT SLOWDOWN IN ACTIVITY FROM A SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE (cont’d)
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The relationship between GDP growth and that of 
employment in the Spanish economy is not constant over 
time. In particular, it varies appreciably depending on the 
phase of the economic cycle. As Chart 1.1 shows, during 
the economic upturn from 1995 to 2008, increases in the 
level of employment were systematically somewhat lower 
than those posted by GDP. This translated into very 
moderate growth in apparent labour productivity (0.5% 
per annum on average). Conversely, during the 
recessionary phase from 2008 to 2013, the rate of job 
destruction far outpaced the rate of decline of GDP, 
prompting marked increases in apparent productivity 
(2.3% per annum on average). In the current expansionary 
phase a very close relationship between increases in 
employment and those in economic activity has again 
been observed. That has once more given rise to very 
limited rises in apparent labour productivity since 2014, 
averaging 0.2% per annum, a figure even below that 
observed in the previous upturn (and with negative values 
in some of the more recent quarters).
This countercyclical behaviour of productivity is a 
differential factor of the Spanish economy, as this variable 
tends to be procyclical in most of the advanced 
economies. Thus, for instance, as Chart 1.2 shows, 
compared with Spain, productivity in the euro area as a 
whole (excluding Spain) tends to grow more in 
expansionary periods and to decline in recessionary 
episodes. That explains why the correlation between the 
increase in GDP and that in productivity over the 1995-
2019 period as a whole is positive and high in the euro 
area (0.9), compared with the negative correlation 
observed in the Spanish economy (-0.7).1
The way in which the relationship between activity and 
employment changes in the Spanish economy depending 
on the cyclical phase can also be seen in Chart 2.1, 
featuring all the different market economy sectors. The 
chart depicts two regression lines relating, respectively, to 
the quarters in which the year-on-year rate of market GVA 
(identified with blue dots) increases, and to those others in 
Box 9
RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	GDP	GROWTH	AND	EMPLOYMENT	IN	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY
1  A. Urtasun, M. Izquierdo and E. Ortega (2012), in “Un análisis sectorial de la relación entre la actividad y el empleo en la economía 
española”, Boletín Económico, Banco de España, July-August, show how, although there are sector-based differences in the 
relationship between employment and output, asymmetrical behaviour in the different phases of the cycle is common to all sectors. 
Accordingly, the countercyclical pattern of productivity is not attributable to the changes in the productive structure that arise in 
expansions and recessions.
SOURCES: QNA (INE) and Eurostat.
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which it falls (identified with red dots). The slope of each 
of the regression lines estimated determines how much 
the rate of job creation in these sectors increases (falls) for 
each percentage point of increase (decline) in the pace of 
activity. This sensitivity of employment to GVA is, both in 
expansionary and in recessionary periods, very close to 
one and is not statistically different from one type of 
period to another. By contrast, the constant of the 
estimated lines, which determines what the rate of change 
of employment is when the GDP growth rate is around 
zero, is considerably greater, in absolute terms, in 
recessions (-2.7) than in expansions (-0.3). This entails an 
evident discontinuity in the behaviour of employment 
when the economy moves from an expansionary phase 
into recession, and vice versa. In particular, when the GVA 
of the market sectors shifts from growing marginally to 
shrinking slightly, the rate of job destruction leaps sharply, 
by almost 2.5 pp on average. And, for more acute 
recessions, this is the magnitude by which the year-on-
year decline in employment exceeds, on average, that of 
value added.
Consequently, during crises there is high job destruction 
irrespective of the depth of the fall-off in activity. The 
factors that might lie behind this phenomenon include the 
fact that many of the jobs created during expansionary 
periods, often under temporary contracts, have a low 
level of productivity associated with them. This means 
that, in the face of a negative shock, they cease to be 
economically viable from the employer’s standpoint.2 The 
historically low use of adjustment mechanisms other than 
employment would mean that this effect would hold until 
such workers began to be taken on again in the 
expansionary period.
Chart 2.2 illustrates how the foregoing cyclical pattern of 
the Spanish economy, one that is asymmetrical between 
expansions and recessions, is not seen in the euro area as 
a whole. There, employment reacts to GDP growth, 
approximately with the same intensity irrespective of the 
cyclical phase, without the relationship between 
employment and activity experiencing notable 
discontinuity as the shift from an expansion to a recession 
(or vice versa) occurs.3
Focusing on the latest period of recovery in the Spanish 
economy, we might question to what extent any change in 
the employment-GDP relationship can be seen compared 
with the previous expansionary phase. In this respect, 
Box 9
RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	GDP	GROWTH	AND	EMPLOYMENT	IN	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(cont’d)
2  In J. Costain, J. F. Jimeno and C. Thomas (2010), “Employment fluctuations in a dual labor market”, Documento de Trabajo 1013, 
Banco	de	España,	the	authors	show	the	significance	of	this	mechanism	for	explaining	the	fluctuations	in	employment	in	the	Spanish	
economy.
3	 	Indeed,	 less	 job	 destruction	 is	 observed	 in	 recessions,	 which	 probably	 reflects	 the	 use	 of	 alternative	 labour-cost-adjustment	
mechanisms, such as hours worked, at times of a decline in activity.
SOURCES: QNA (INE) and Eurostat.
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Chart 3.1 suggests that, given specific GDP growth, the 
growth rate of employment has been slightly higher in the 
2014-2019 period (the observations of which are depicted 
with red dots) compared with the 1995-2008 period (blue 
dots). That is to say, if in the current expansionary phase 
the same employment-GDP relationship as was observed 
during the 1995-2008 period had been maintained, 
employment growth would have been somewhat lower 
than has actually been the case.
We obtain the same result when estimating a model with 
time-varying parameters. In particular, on the basis of 
these estimates, Chart 3.2 shows how the GDP growth 
threshold above which employment is created would have 
fallen slightly in the most recent period, to stand at slightly 
below 1%.4 However, it would be necessary to await a full 
cyclical phase to be able to ensure these values differ.
The fact that employment is performing in a comparatively 
more dynamic fashion in the current expansionary phase 
might be due to very different factors. These might include 
the differences between the two expansionary phases 
analysed, in terms of intensity, duration and composition 
of growth, along with the possible effects arising from 
acute job destruction during the crisis (e.g. in terms of the 
loss of skills – and the associated reduction in productivity 
– of those workers who remained unemployed for a long 
time). 
One additional factor might be the legislative changes to 
the labour market during the opening years of this decade. 
In connection with this, the fact that there has been no 
new recessionary period since the introduction of the 
latest labour-related legislative measures means it would 
be premature to assess the extent to which such measures 
might have altered the employment-GDP relationship in 
the Spanish economy. In this respect, the labour legislation 
approved early this decade developed mechanisms 
aimed at having the labour market adjustment in the 
downturn in the cycle fall to a greater extent than to date 
on variables other than employment. That should 
contribute to lessening job losses at the time at which the 
economy were to go into recession, in a similar fashion to 
what is usually seen in other economies. This is not, 
however, the baseline scenario currently envisaged for the 
coming years. Over that period, a prolongation of the 
expansionary phase is foreseen, with growth rates for 
employment not differing greatly from those for output.5
Box 9
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SOURCE: QNA (INE).
y = 1.0892x – 0.8175
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
GDP
1  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN EXPANSIONARY
PERIODS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY. MARKET ECONOMY
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
Average 1995 Q1 - 2008 Q3 Average 2014 Q1 - 2019 Q2
2  ESTIMATED GVA GROWTH THRESHOLD ABOVE WHICH EMPLOYMENT IS CREATED. 
MARKET ECONOMY
Chart 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
4  When the following model, namely DEmpleo	=	a + bDPIB + e, is estimated, the GDP growth threshold above which employment is 
created	(PIB*)	is	determined	by	PIB*	=	–a/b.
5  See the Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2019-2022): the Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s 
December 2019 joint forecasting exercise.
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As optimism on resolution of the US-China trade conflict has 
heightened, the risk appetite has increased 
In	Q4	to	date,	the	international	financial	markets	have	been	marked,	in	general,	
by	positive	 investor	sentiment.	This has translated into higher prices for riskier 
assets, higher long-term sovereign debt yields and lower volatility in market prices. 
As in past quarters, the news of different signs associated with the US-China trade 
negotiations was the main driver of financial asset price fluctuations. Market 
performance was also affected by the release of activity indicators which, in general, 
were somewhat better than expected, and by the heightened expectations of a 
Brexit deal being reached. 
Stock	market	prices	rose	in	most	international	markets.	In recent months, US 
stock market indices have recorded all-time highs, and European indices highs for 
the year (see Chart 2.1). In 2019 to date, both the S&P 500 and the EURO STOXX 50 
have gained more than 20%. Stock market indices in emerging market economies 
have also risen in general in recent months, with the Latin American markets posting 
the worst performance, against a backdrop of socio-political tension in the region.
The	 increase	 in	 long-term	 sovereign	 debt	 yields	 in	 advanced	 economies	
reflects	growing	stability	in	the	global	economic	outlook.	The apparent halt in 
the deterioration of global activity appears to have led to greater appetite for risk and 
to an upward revision of monetary policy interest rate expectations. This in turn 
explains the increase in long-term bond yields in advanced economies. Following 
the all-time lows recorded in the previous quarter, US treasury 10- and 30-year bond 
yields have gradually risen, to 1.9% and 2.3%, respectively, at the cut-off date for 
this report (see Chart 2.2). In turn, 10-year sovereign debt yields in Spain, France and 
Germany have increased by between 25 bp and 30 bp in the quarter, although they 
remain in negative territory both in France and Germany. In Italy they have risen by 
slightly more (37 bp).
Following	the	surge	at	the	beginning	of	October,	corporate	debt	yield	spreads	
have	narrowed	substantially	as	the	quarter	has	progressed,	 in	keeping	with	
the	greater	appetite	for	risk.	Both US and European high-yield corporate spreads 
(over sovereign bonds) have narrowed in the quarter to date, by 49 bp and 51 bp, 
respectively. In the foreign exchange markets, the appreciation of the pound sterling 
– 8.5% against the dollar and 6.1% against the euro – has been the most significant 
development, as a result of the growing expectations, consolidated after the UK 
general election, of a Brexit deal being reached.
2	 INTERNATIONAL	FINANCIAL	MARKETS
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The	 monetary	 policy	 stance	 of	 the	 main	 central	 banks	 continues	 to	 be	
accommodative. The US Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate at its October 
meeting, for the third consecutive time in 2019, and then left it unchanged at the 
December meeting. As both decisions were broadly factored in by the markets, 
there was no significant market reaction. The FOMC projections released after the 
December meeting indicate that the federal funds rate will remain unchanged 
throughout 2020. The ECB, for its part, adopted no monetary policy measures at 
either its October or December meeting. Regarding the effects of the broad package 
of measures approved in September, the introduction of the two-tier system for 
remuneration of reserves has facilitated a large-scale redistribution of credit 
institutions’ excess liquidity holdings, with no persistent increases in interbank 
market rates. At the cut-off date of this report, the markets expect the federal funds 
rate to be 25 bp below its current level at December 2020, and the ECB’s deposit 
facility rate to remain unchanged throughout the rest of 2019 and the whole of 2020. 
Lastly, compared with end-September, instantaneous forward OIS curves have 
risen, both in the euro area and the United States, signalling lower interest rate cut 
expectations.
This last quarter of the year has been marked by greater appetite for risk, with gains on the main stock markets and increases in long-term
sovereign debt yields, which have also been influenced by expectations of lower policy rate cuts.
STOCK MARKET GAINS AND INCREASES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT YIELDS, AGAINST A BACKDROP OF GREATER APPETITE
FOR RISK
Chart 2
SOURCE: Refinitiv Datastream.
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3.1  External environment of the euro area
Global economic growth remains weak, weighed down by trade and 
political uncertainties and by the social conflicts that have recently 
erupted in some emerging market economies, especially in Latin 
America
Global	economic	growth	has	remained	sluggish	in	the	second	half	of	the	year. 
Despite some degree of easing in recent months, persistent trade tensions continue 
to generate uncertainty, thus eroding confidence among households and firms. 
Foreign trade has remained weak and the continuing subdued tone of investment 
and the manufacturing sector is beginning to spread to some services sectors. By 
contrast, private sector consumption continues to be the main buttress of global 
growth.
The	moderate	growth	dynamic	has	been	widespread	across	most	geographical	
areas. In the United States, GDP rose by 2.1% year-on-year in Q3, 0.2 pp below the 
previous figure, confirming the slowdown that began at the start of the year (see 
Chart 3.1). China, for its part, is facing a gradual weakening of domestic demand 
which the recent stimulus measures have been unable to halt to date: GDP growth 
of 6% year-on-year in Q3 is the lowest figure in more than a quarter of a century. In 
the United Kingdom, the uncertainty over Brexit has continued to weigh considerably 
on growth, which at 0.3% quarter-on-quarter was worse than expected but is an 
improvement on the contraction observed in Q2 (-0.4%). Moreover, the Conservative 
Party’s decisive victory in the December general election clears the path, not only 
for parliamentary ratification, before the 31  January deadline, of the Withdrawal 
Agreement reached with the European Union back in October, but also for the start 
of the negotiations on the future relationship with the European Union, with a very 
tight schedule. In Japan, the rate of growth accelerated to 1.9% year-on-year, 
underpinned by the strength of domestic demand and, especially, of consumption, 
ahead of the planned increase in VAT. Among the emerging market economies the 
performance differed across regions: the relative strength of the eastern European 
countries contrasts with the greater weakness of emerging Asia (largely due to India) 
and of Latin America (where weakness was widespread, see Chart 3.2). In Argentina, 
the new government announced that it is unable to repay its debts, especially those 
with 2020 maturities, and that it will hold meetings with its private creditors and with 
the IMF.
3 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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The	 economic	 outlook	 for	 2020,	which	 had	 gradually	worsened	 as	 the	 year	
progressed,	 appears	 to	 have	 steadied	 in	 recent	weeks. Thus, the Consensus 
global growth forecast for 2020 has been reduced from 3.6% year-on-year back in 
January to 3.3% currently, with downward revisions for most emerging market 
economies (especially in Latin America) and, to a lesser extent, for advanced 
economies where there have even been some upward revisions in recent months (see 
Charts 3.3 and 3.4).
Sluggish trade and uncertainty, heightened by the recent social turmoil, concentrated in Latin America, continue to weigh on the global 
economy; growth projections have been progressively cut in 2019.
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY REMAINS SLUGGISH
Chart 3
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters Datastream and Consensus. Latest observation: 2019 Q3 (for eastern Europe and Latin America 2019 Q2).
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A	new	source	of	uncertainty	weighing	on	 the	outlook	 for	emerging	market	
economies	are	the	social	conflicts	that	have	recently	erupted.	In Latin America, 
the perception of growing inequality, and discontent among a sector of the 
population with certain recent measures, have triggered a wave of protests with a 
high economic cost, especially in Chile and Colombia. Points of conflict are also in 
evidence in Asia, specifically in Hong Kong where demands for preservation of 
certain civil rights continue to fuel social tensions. In all cases, the outcome of this 
social unrest has been a downward revision of the growth outlook for the respective 
economies.
The global trade dynamic remains negative, despite the slight 
improvement in the outlook for US-China trade talks
The	 figures	 for	 September	 suggest	 that	 world	 trade	 has	 remained	
contractionary, with a fall of 1.1% year-on-year, focused mainly on China and 
emerging Asia (see Chart 4.1). The growth observed in quarterly terms is considered 
to be only temporary, a result of the increase in trade ahead of the tariff round 
announced for 15 October but which was finally called off. 
However,	 as	 the	 prospects	 of	 a	 US-China	 trade	 deal	 being	 reached	 have	
improved,	 short-term	 indicators	 have	 steadied	 or	 have	 even	 improved	
somewhat	(see	Chart 4.2). The more conciliatory tone that became more evident 
in both governments’ declarations as the quarter progressed, allowed the first phase 
of trade talks to be concluded successfully by the cut-off date of this report. By 
virtue of the agreement reached, the United States and China called off the tariffs 
announced for 15 December. In addition, the United States agreed to halve the tariffs 
imposed in September, while China adopted a series of commitments in several 
areas: an increase in its US imports (especially of agricultural goods), lower non-
tariff barriers, protection of intellectual property rights, market access for US financial 
firms and stability of the yuan.
Yet	the	risks	for	world	trade	remain	on	the	downside. The improved prospects 
of a deal being reached with China coincided with a deterioration in US trade links 
with other areas. The US government announced that new tariffs would be imposed 
on imports from the euro area, in response to a dispute between the two economies 
in the aeronautical sector, at the same time as restrictions were re-established on 
steel and aluminium from Argentina and Brazil. In addition, the uncertainty persists 
over the US decision to impose tariffs on automobiles. On a more positive note, in 
Congress Democrats and Republicans reached a consensus on revision of the trade 
agreement with Mexico and Canada (USMCA). 
Monetary	 policies	 have	 remained	 accommodative,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	weak	
economic	 environment	 and	 low	 inflation	 rates	 prevalent	 in	 the	 advanced	
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economies	and	in	most	emerging	market	economies. At its October meeting, 
and as expected by the markets, the US Federal Reserve again cut the federal 
funds rate by 25 bp, down to a range of 1.5%-1.75%, in response to the risks posed 
by global developments against a backdrop of contained inflation. At its December 
meeting, the Federal Reserve confirmed that, unless the outlook were to change, 
the current monetary policy stance is correct. In China, the swine fever epidemic 
has driven inflation up to a historically high rate of 4.5% year-on-year. Although this 
is an eminently temporary increase, the risk that it may ultimately filter through to 
inflation expectations has led the central bank to maintain a cautious stance. In 
consequence, despite the weak activity levels, it has made only very modest cuts 
to its policy rates.
Save	in	Latin	America,	where	social	unrest	has	weighed	both	on	exchange	
rates	and	the	stock	markets,	emerging	market	financial	markets	have	been	
steady. There has been no brusque depreciation in exchange rates, and some 
have even appreciated (for example, in the case of China and Russia), in line with 
the greater optimism regarding the trade conflict and with the monetary policy 
measures described earlier (see Chart  5.2). In the commodities markets, oil 
prices have risen slightly, to almost $62 per barrel, driven by supply-side factors 
that have offset the decline in global demand, while industrial metal prices have 
fallen.
The areas most affected by the contraction are China and emerging Asia. The latest short-term indicators appear to be improving slightly in 
light of the easing in trade tensions.
TRADE FLOWS REMAIN WEAK IN Q3
Chart 4
SOURCES: CPB and IHS Markit. Latest observation: September 2019 (Chart 4.1), November 2019 (Chart 4.2).
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3.2  The euro area and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy
Weighed down by the external sector, the euro area is undergoing a 
period of discreet growth…
The	 euro	 area	 grew	moderately	 in	 2019	 Q3. GDP grew by 0.2% quarter-on-
quarter, a figure similar to that of the previous quarter and slightly above what was 
expected in the ECB’s September projection exercise (see Chart 6.1). The year-on-
year growth rate of GDP held steady at 1.1%. By country, economic activity was 
particularly weak in Germany and Italy, where GDP remained practically stagnant 
(see Chart 6.2), although in Germany output was expected to fall for the second 
consecutive quarter. 
By	component,	GDP	growth	was	underpinned	by	domestic	demand	and,	 in	
particular,	by	the	upturn	in	private	consumption (see Chart 6.3). The growth of 
wage income and employment against a background of moderate inflation, along 
with asset price appreciation and favourable financing conditions, continued to 
sustain consumer confidence and household spending. By contrast, the external 
sector continued to trim back the momentum of GDP as a result of the moderation 
of international trade. In addition, the change in stock building made a negative 
The moderate inflation environment enables the emerging areas to adopt an expansionary stance, in line with their advanced counterparts, 
assisted by the stability on foreign exchange markets. Latin America retains an accommodative stance, although the recent social instability 
has affected its financial markets.
EXPANSIONARY MONETARY POLICY IN EMERGING AREAS. FINANCIAL MARKETS STABLE, EXCEPT IN LATIN AMERICA
Chart 5
SOURCES: IFS and JP Morgan. Latest observation: 10 December.
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contribution to output growth. On the supply side, industrial production contracted 
in Q3, weighed down by the external sector, while activity in services slowed, 
particularly in the sub-sectors most directly linked to the industrial sector. Activity in 
the construction sector proved resilient to the general trend of moderation. 
The	information	relating	to	Q4	continues	to	point	to	a	lack	of	vigour	in	euro	
area	economic	activity.	Foreign trade shows no signs of recovery and the industrial 
activity indicators remain on the contractionary side. The indicators of activity in the 
services sector also show somewhat lower average levels than in Q3. However, 
employment expectations in both services and construction have improved slightly 
and the unemployment rate continued to fall gradually, standing at 7.5% in October. 
In	the	medium	term,	the	economic	outlook	of	the	euro	area	is	also	modest. The 
growth scenario continues to be influenced by the slowdown of the global economy, 
the trend towards trade protectionism, the situation of the car sector and the 
persistent uncertainty over trade tensions and the final outcome of Brexit. In the long 
term, there are structural factors which also presage a low-growth scenario in the 
euro area. These include the low productivity of the economy, demographics and 
the structural slowdown in China. 
Euro area GDP growth remained weak in Q3, especially in Germany and Italy. Domestic demand, particularly private consumption, 
underpinned the increase in GDP.
PROLONGATION OF EURO AREA ECONOMIC SLUGGISHNESS
Chart 6
SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics and ECB.
a Excluding Ireland, owing to the major fluctuations shown by some of its GDP components as a result of the effect of multinationals.
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The	 Eurosystem	 projection	 exercise	 published	 in	 December	 confirms	 a	
scenario	of	modest	growth	in	euro	area. Specifically, the projections are for GDP 
growth of 1.2% in 2019, 1.1% in 2020 and 1.4% in 2021 and 2022 (see Table 2). 
Despite more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, this exercise (which adds 
an extra year to the projection horizon) has revised GDP growth slightly downward 
in 2020 as a result of the moderation of world trade. The risks to this scenario of 
growth continue to be tilted downwards, mainly because of the uncertainty over 
trade and Brexit (now not so much over the exit agreement as over the terms of the 
future bilateral relationship between the EU and the UK). 
… and a contained inflation outlook 
Euro	area	inflation	continues	at	low	levels. The fall in energy prices shaped the 
course of the overall inflation rate up to October, when it dropped to 0.7%. This trend 
was, however, interrupted in November, when, on preliminary information, the 
inflation rate rose to 1% due to higher inflation in both services and food. Core 
inflation (excluding energy and food prices) has increased in the last few months to 
stand at 1.3% in November (see Chart 7.1). In any event, inflationary pressure 
continues to be moderate, with no apparent pass-through of the higher labour costs 
to prices (see Chart 7.2). Long-term inflation expectations, which are at very low 
levels, remain on a slightly downward trend (see Chart 9.3). 
The	Eurosystem’s	December	projection	exercise	anticipates	a	 low	medium-
term	inflation	scenario.	Specifically, it is envisaged that inflation will stand at 1.2% 
in 2019 and 1.1% in 2020, and will later rise to 1.4% and 1.6% in 2021 and 2022, 
respectively. These figures are in line with the projections of other international 
agencies (see Table 2). Both higher oil prices and depreciation of the euro have 
contributed to the slight upward revision of inflation in 2020 (0.1 pp). 
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH FORECAST (a)
Table 2
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a The figures in brackets are the change with respect to the previous forecast, which relates to September 2019 for the ECB, July for the EC, September 
for the OECD, July for the IMF and November for Consensus.
2019 2020 2021 2022
GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP
European Central Bank (December 2019) 1.2 (+0.1) 1.2 (0.0) 1.1 (-0.1) 1.1 (+0.1) 1.4 (0.0) 1.4 (-0.1) 1.4 1.6
European Commission (November 2019) 1.1 (-0.1) 1.2 (-0.1) 1.2 (-0.2) 1.2 (-0.1) 1.2 1.3
4.12.11.1)1.0+( 1.12.1)1.0+( 2.1November 2019)( DCEO
International Monetary Fund (October 2019) 1.2 (-0.1) 1.2 1.4 (-0.2) 1.4 1.4 1.5
Consensus Forecast (December 2019) 1.2 (+0.1) 1.2 (0.0) 1.0 (0.0) 1.2 (0.0) — —
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Euro area fiscal policy will adopt a moderately expansionary stance in 
2020…
Fiscal	policy	will	adopt	an	expansionary	stance	in	2020	for	the	euro	area	as	a	
whole,	albeit	with	differences	among	countries.	The budgetary plans for 2020 
envisage that the government deficit for the euro area as a whole will remain at 0.8% 
of GDP. No country is subject to the excessive deficit procedure, although the 
European Commission has warned of the high risk of significant deviations from 
medium-term budgetary targets in a fairly high number of countries. Box 3 looks in 
detail at these figures and presents an exercise on the macroeconomic effects in the 
euro area of a more ambitious fiscal expansion in the countries which have additional 
room to manoeuvre.
…while financial conditions have become more expansionary in recent 
months...
Financial	conditions	continue	to	be	easy,	having	relaxed	further	in	the	last	few	
months,	in	line	with	the	more	accommodative	stance	of	monetary	policy. Thus, 
Inflation rose in November to 1% (1.3% excluding energy and food), interrupting the declining path of the previous months. That said, levels 
are low, and there has been no discernible pass-through of higher labour costs to prices. Long-term inflation expectations are holding on a 
downward trend.
INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA REMAINS AT LOW LEVELS
Chart 7
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Eurostat and ECB.
a In 2019 this variable includes the conversion in France of the tax credit for competitiveness and employment (CICE) into a permanent social 
contributions rebate.
b Quarterly average of daily data.
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interest rates on new loans have decreased in most segments to stand at historically 
low levels. Furthermore, according to the Bank Lending Survey, in Q3 credit standards 
for approving loans relaxed slightly in business and house purchase lending. This is 
consistent with the results of the ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises 
(SAFE), which shows that SMEs reported an improvement in their access to external 
finance between April and September. 
In	 its	October	and	December	meetings,	 the	ECB	Governing	Council	did	not	
adopt	additional	monetary	policy	measures,	 as	anticipated	by	markets	and	
analysts. Despite the absence of surprises, the expectations prevailing at end-
September that interest rates would decline in 2020 have progressively faded during 
the course of the quarter to date. As noted in section 2, at the end of October the 
ECB began to apply the new two-tier system for remuneration of reserves under 
which an interest rate of 0% is applied to a portion of banks’ excess liquidity. Banks 
of all jurisdictions have taken advantage of this change to optimise their surplus 
liquidity, giving rise to a redistribution of this liquidity among banks without any 
persisting effects on interbank market interest rates.
…and bank lending to the private sector continues to expand 
Bank	credit	to	the	non-financial	private	sector	has	continued	to	grow	strongly	
in	recent	months. Business loans grew at a year-on-year rate of 3.8% in October, 
somewhat more slowly than in previous months. For their part, funds obtained 
through the issuance of fixed-income securities grew more strongly (5.2% in 
September), indicating that non-financial corporations are substituting their financing 
sources to some extent. Household credit continued to accelerate gradually, growing 
at a rate of 3.5% in October as a result of brisker house purchase lending and less 
vigorous consumer credit. The M3 monetary aggregate showed year-on-year growth 
of 5.6% in October, up 0.5 pp on July. This behaviour was similar to that of the 
narrower M1 aggregate, which grew by 8.4% in October.
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The current financing conditions continue to be supportive of private 
spending 
Spanish	financial	market	behaviour	in	Q4	has	been	in	line	with	that	of	the	rest	
of	the	euro	area. Thus, in the quarter so far up to the cut-off date of this Report, the 
IBEX-35 has gained 4.7%, against a background of greater risk appetite that has 
characterised the international stock markets. In the government debt markets, the 
10-year Spanish bond yield has increased by 25 bp to 0.41%, a quantity similar to 
the change in the yield of the equivalent German bond, so the Spanish sovereign risk 
premium remained around 70 bp. Lastly, 12-month EURIBOR has risen by 7 bp to 
-0.26%, in line with the slight upward revision of future expectations for monetary 
policy interest rates.
In	 recent	months	 the	 financing	 conditions	 of	 the	 non-financial	 private	 sector	
have	remained	accommodative.	The interest rates applied to new loans decreased 
slightly in most segments. The cost of corporate debt issuance has risen since August, 
in line with events on the interbank markets, but remains below the levels prevailing 
before summer (see Box 4). According to the responses received in the BLS, the credit 
standards for approving loans remained unchanged in Q3 for housing loans and 
business lending and have tightened slightly for consumer credit and other lending, 
basically due to the lower borrower solvency perceived by banks (see Chart 8.1). In line 
with these developments, the BLS evidences a further increase in the share of rejected 
loan applications in the consumer credit and other lending segment and also, albeit 
more moderate, in the house purchase lending segment (see Chart 8.2). Additionally, 
the results of the ECB’s SAFE survey continue to signal improvements, although 
progressively smaller, in the availability of bank credit to Spanish SMEs (see Box 5).
The Spanish economy has continued to expand in the second half of 
2019, with growth rates exceeding those of the euro area.
The	Spanish	economy	maintained	its	growth	rate	in	2019	Q3	owing	to	higher	
domestic	 demand,	 which	 offset	 the	 weakening	 of	 the	 external	 sector. 
Specifically, GDP increased by 0.4% in seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter 
terms, as in the preceding quarter (see Chart 9.1). However, the composition of 
growth varied significantly, since it was underpinned by an appreciable rise in 
domestic demand which offset the negative contribution to output growth from the 
external sector (see Chart 9.2). The acceleration in domestic demand seems to be 
mainly due to the strong dynamism of capital goods investment and consumption 
4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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(particularly by households), which contrasts with the relative weakness of these 
items in the previous quarter. Conversely, investment in construction, particularly in 
the non-residential segment, contracted in the quarter. The contribution from net 
external demand was negative, after four quarters in which it was positive. This 
resulted from a fall in goods and services exports, against a background of 
contraction in international trade transactions, and from an increase in imports. This 
increase in purchases abroad reflected, at least in part, a rise in investment in capital 
goods, a component with a very high import content.
On	the	latest	information	available,	the	Spanish	economy	has	remained	on	an	
expansionary	 path	 in	 Q4. In this period, according to the partial information 
available, GDP has grown at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.4%, although the 
composition of growth has been more balanced. Thus, domestic demand seems to 
have returned to more moderate growth rates, while the contribution of the external 
sector appears to have been positive again, thanks to the recovery of exports and a 
certain slowing of imports.
The	Spanish	economy	continues	to	have	a	positive	growth	differential	relative	
to	the	euro	area,	but	this	is	expected	to	narrow	gradually	over	the	horizon	of	
In Q3, lending standards are estimated to have held unchanged with regard to lending to households for house purchases and to financing 
for firms, and to have tightened slightly in consumer credit and other lending. This was essentially due to the perceived lower solvency of 
borrowers in this latter segment by banks. In line with these developments, the BLS evidences a fresh increase in the share of rejected loan 
applications in consumer credit and other lending and also, albeit more moderately, in that of lending for house purchases.
LENDING STANDARDS TO HOUSEHOLDS FOR CONSUMER CREDIT AND OTHER LENDING TIGHTENED SLIGHTLY IN Q3
Chart 8
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Bank Lending Survey. Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened their credit standards or conditions considerably × 1 + percentage 
of banks that have tightened their credit standards or conditions somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards 
or conditions somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards or conditions considerably × 1.
b Bank Lending Survey. Indicator = percentage of banks reporting a considerable increase × 1 + percentage of banks reporting some increase 
× 1/2 – percentage of banks reporting some decrease × 1/2 – percentage of banks reporting a considerable decrease × 1.
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the	 latest	 projections	 of	 the	 Banco	 de	 España.8 The Spanish economy is 
estimated to have maintained a positive growth differential relative to the euro area 
in Q4. From the viewpoint of the supply, this gap appears to partly reflect more 
favourable developments in industry in Spain than on aggregate in the euro area, 
where the deterioration in the external environment and the weakness of the 
automotive sector appear to have had a greater impact. In Spain, moreover, the 
services industries appear to have been less sensitive to the decline in manufacturing 
activity than in other euro area economies. In any case, a gradual slowdown in the 
Spanish economy is expected over the next few years, which would lead to a 
progressive narrowing of the growth differential relative to euro area.
Employment	appears	to	have	stabilised	in	Q4,	following	the	sharp	slowdown	
in	 the	 summer. The Social Security registrations data, available to November, 
suggest that the quarter-on-quarter growth of employment was similar to the rate in 
Q3 and in line with the growth rate of activity (see Chart 10 and Box 9). According to 
the Spanish labour force survey, the unemployment rate stood at 13.9% in Q3, down 
0.7 percentage points (pp) from its level in the same period of 2018. However, in 
The Spanish economy continues to be more buoyant than the main euro area economies. Output growth in Q4 is expected to be more
balanced, with a somewhat more moderate contribution by domestic demand and a positive contribution by the external sector.
THE SPANISH ECONOMY REMAINS ROBUST
Chart 9
SOURCES: INE, ECB and Banco de España.
a For 2019 Q4, Banco de España forecasts for the Spanish economy and ECB forecasts for the euro area.
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8  See “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2019-2022): the Banco de España’s 
contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2019 joint forecasting exercise”.
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recent quarters, the rate of decline of unemployment appears to have moderated 
and, according to the registered unemployment data available to November, this 
appears to have continued in Q4. These unemployment developments reflect the 
lower employment growth and the increase in the labour force.
Domestic demand appears to be contributing positively to growth, 
albeit at a more moderate rate than in Q3 owing to the reduced 
buoyancy of private consumption and business investment 
The	momentum	 of	 private	 consumption	 appears	 to	 have	moderated	 in	 Q4,	
after	growing	at	very	high	rates	 in	Q3.	Developments in retail trade, consumer 
credit and confidence indicators would be consistent with a decline in the growth 
rate of household spending on goods and services in the final part of the year (see 
Charts 11 and 12.1). In any event, the growth of this component appears to have 
been greater than in the first half of the year. In contrast to this aggregate behaviour, 
the year-on-year decline in registrations of private vehicles has moderated in recent 
months, although this is closely related to the base effect arising from the fact that 
the rate is calculated by comparing with the autumn months of 2018, when there was 
a sharp decline.
Households	appear	to	have	become	somewhat	more	cautious	in	their	spending	
decisions,	as	reflected	by	the	rise	in	the	savings	rate. In any event, the buoyancy 
Employment growth in Q4 is similar to that in Q3. The declining trend in the unemployment rate has been checked slightly.
THE GROWTH RATE OF EMPLOYMENT IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE STABILISED IN Q4
Chart 10
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
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of consumption will continue to be underpinned by employment creation (although 
this is showing signs of deceleration), favourable financing conditions and the 
improvement in the financial position of households. Thus, the household debt burden 
and debt ratio relative to gross disposable income appear to have continued to 
decline in the final months of the year, while household wealth appears to have 
continued to increase.
Residential	investment	appears	to	have	picked	up	in	the	latter	part	of	the	
year,	 following	 its	decline	 in	Q3.	 In the two middle quarters of the year, the 
activity indicators for the sector slowed more sharply than in previous quarters. 
Specifically, house purchases decreased during the summer, with a somewhat 
more pronounced fall in the case of new housing. However, the latest data 
available, relating to October, point to a certain recovery in transactions and a 
modest rise in new lending for house purchase. In this respect, although this 
recent slowdown in residential construction may partly reflect a gradual 
adaptation by agents to the Law on real estate credit, which came into force in 
June, the existence of a more persistent component cannot be ruled out. As 
regards the supply indicators, building approvals have also begun to decline in 
recent months.
The	growth	of	house	prices	moderated	in	Q3.	The slowdown occurred in most 
regions, in both the new and second-hand housing segments. In the case of new 
housing, prices were, in real terms, around 16% below their pre-crisis highs. Second-
The pace of private consumption is estimated to have fallen somewhat in Q4, after surging in Q3. The moderation in job creation, the 
slackness of new consumer finance lending and the unfavourable course of the confidence indicators contribute to explaining these 
developments.
THE INCREASE IN CONSUMPTION EASES COMPARED WITH THE HIGH GROWTH RECORDED IN Q3
Chart 11
SOURCES: European Commission, INE and Banco de España.
a Data observed to October and forecasts for the remainder of the quarter.
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hand house prices, meanwhile, stood at 34% below their peak levels of 2007. In both 
cases, the behaviour across regions varied considerably.
Following	the	exceptional	growth	recorded	in	Q3,	business	investment	appears	
to	have	returned	to	more	moderate	rates	in	the	final	months	of	the	year.	Some 
indicators, such as the manufacturing PMI, confirm the prolongation of the 
deterioration in business confidence, against a background of a persistently high 
degree of uncertainty (see Chart 13). These factors may curb medium-term 
investment somewhat, although financial conditions remain accommodative and 
businesses continue to deleverage. 
In	 this	context,	 the	 financing	of	non-financial	corporations	appears	 to	have	
deviated	in	October	from	the	expansionary	path	displayed	from	mid-2018. This 
development is a result of a slowdown in the financing raised through bond issuance 
and of a greater contraction in credit received from resident institutions and of 
financing from abroad (although these items are affected by base effects given the 
unusual growth recorded in the same month of 2018 – see Chart 12.2). In terms of 
new lending, credit has also displayed signs of weakness recently, particularly in the 
segment of loans of up to €1 million.
Consumer credit to households has continued slowing, on the trend recorded since the second half of 2018, and other lending has shrunk 
at a greater rate, dragging total net financing flows to households into negative territory. Financing via debt securities issues at non-financial 
corporations has slowed in recent months and this, combined with a higher rate of decline in credit obtained from resident institutions and 
from abroad, has meant that overall external financing is now contracting.
IN OCTOBER, FINANCING TO THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR SHRANK IN YEAR-ON-YEAR TERMS FOR THE FIRST
TIME SINCE MID-2018
Chart 12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Securitised lending in these segments not included.
b Includes issues by resident subsidiaries.
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Exports recovered some momentum, after their weakness in the 
previous quarter, while the growth rate of imports moderated
The	external	sector	appears	to	have	improved	its	contribution	to	output	growth	
during	 the	 current	 quarter,	 following	 its	 negative	 contribution	 in	Q3. In Q3, 
exports weakened, while imports picked up, resulting in a sizeable negative 
contribution by external demand to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth. The still-very-
partial information available for Q4 suggests that exports grew moderately, 
constrained by the weakness of international trade. On the imports side, there 
appears to have been a certain slowdown in the growth rate of purchases from the 
rest of the world. This would basically reflect the moderation in capital goods 
investment, although the improvement in domestic production in the automotive 
industry would point to a rise purchases of intermediate goods from abroad (see 
Chart 14).
Goods	exports	continued	to	grow	in	Q3,	albeit	at	a	very	moderate	rate	after	
their	strong	growth	in	the	preceding	quarter.	On customs data, the increase in 
real goods exports was based on a pronounced improvement in exports of consumer 
goods, in particular, motor vehicles, which returned to high growth rates, following 
the lack of momentum recorded since the middle of the previous year. Meanwhile, 
the growth rate of exports of capital goods moderated, while exports of non-energy 
intermediate goods remained weak. By geographic area, sales were most buoyant, 
once again, to the EU, including the euro area. For its part, the growth rate of imports 
Investment in capital goods and intangibles posted lower growth, against the background of a worsening business confidence climate and 
persisting uncertainty.
BUSINESS INVESTMENT EASES AFTER STRONG GROWTH IN THE PREVIOUS QUARTER
Chart 13
SOURCES: European Commission, Markit Economics, INE and Banco de España.
a Includes machinery, capital goods, armament systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products.
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accelerated in Q3, this behaviour being broadly based across the various types of 
goods. This development was a result of the rise in domestic demand for consumer 
and capital goods, as well as the increase in exports of motor vehicles and other 
transport equipment, which have a very high import content. 
Turning	to	services	exports,	tourist	spending	continued	to	grow	despite	the	
decline	in	recent	months	in	foreign	visitor	arrivals.	According to the information 
available, up to October, total tourist spending by non-residents remains on an 
upward path, thanks to the increase in the average spending per tourist, which has 
A slightly positive contribution by the external sector to the quarter-on-quarter growth in output is foreseen in 2019 Q4, against the backdrop 
of a more pronounced increase in exports than in imports.
INCREASE IN EXPORTS BOOSTED BY THE RECOVERY IN EUROPEAN DEMAND FOR CARS
Chart 14
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo, Ministerio de Economía y Empresa, ACEA and Turkish Statistical Institute.
a QNA figures at constant prices. Seasonally adjusted series.
b In 2018, car exports to the EU and to Turkey accounted for 88.3% of Spanish car exports.
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offset the slowdown in total arrivals. These developments in tourist spending reflect, 
at least partly, the highly buoyant arrivals of long-distance tourists, who tend to 
spend more, offsetting the decline in arrivals from the main markets (UK, France and 
Germany), which appears to have taken place as a result of the recovery in certain 
competitor destinations in the Mediterranean basin, such as Turkey.
Pass-through to services of the slowdown in activity in industry may be 
taking place.
On	the	supply	side,	the	deterioration	in	manufacturing	is	beginning	to	have	an	
impact	 on	 services	 (see Box 8). Despite the recent improvement in certain 
manufacturing activity indicators (such as, for example, the industrial production 
index), this sector has lost some momentum since the beginning of 2018, affected by 
the weakness of international trade and the unfavourable outlook for the external 
environment. 
Through	 a	 carry-over	 effect,	 this	 deterioration	 in	 industry	 appears	 to	 have	
partly	 contributed	 to	 the	 slowdown	 in	 services. This is already visible in the 
service sector activity indicators, the value-added of market services and social 
security registrations. Manufacturing is a very important customer for some service 
industries. For example, around 20% of sales in transport services, wholesale trade 
and consultancy services are made to manufacturing industry. In line with these 
customer-supplier links, services activities with a higher percentage of sales to 
manufacturing have posted a sharp slowdown in recent quarters (see Box 8).
The latest information available on general government suggests that in 
2019 the budget deficit remained at the same level as in 2018, which is 
insufficient to meet the medium and long-term public finance 
sustainability requirements 
The	 latest	 public	 finance	 developments	would	 be	 compatible	with	 a	 public	
deficit-to-GDP	ratio	in	2019	that	is	unchanged	from	2018. The general government 
deficit, excluding local government, stood in September 2019 at 1.7% of GDP, up 0.2 
pp from the same period of 2018. This deterioration is basically explained by higher 
spending stemming from pension revaluation and the public-sector wage rise 
approved at the end of 2018, as well as the increase in spending on unemployment 
deriving from the benefit rise for the over-52s.9 Notwithstanding, the latest information 
9	 	In	the	specific	case	of	pension	spending,	although	the	contributory	pension	was	revalued	 in	2019	by	a	
similar amount to the previous year (1.6%), the impact of the increase in the regulatory base for the 
widow(er)s’ pension, by a cumulative amount of 8 pp in 2018 and 2019, was concentrated in the latter year.
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would be compatible with an unchanged balance for the year as a whole, largely 
facilitated by the positive behaviour of social contributions which would, in turn, 
partly reflect the effect of the measures adopted in this area at the end of 2018. In 
the opposite direction, tax receipts have slowed somewhat, in line with economic 
developments, which have led to moderation in the growth of the tax bases. Finally, 
the marked decline in the October corporate income tax interim payment relative to 
the same period a year earlier is notable. In 2018, this item recorded an extraordinary 
increase, concentrated among a very limited number of large firms, which has not 
occurred again in 2019.
In	November,	the	European	authorities	advised	the	Spanish	government	of	a	
significant	 risk	 of	 non-compliance	 with	 the	 requirements	 for	 convergence	
towards	structural	budgetary	balance	set	for	2019	and	2020.	Spain, following 
the abrogation in June by the EU Council of the excessive deficit procedure opened 
in 2009, is now subject to the so-called preventive arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. On the latest estimates available, the Spanish general government structural 
deficit is still far from the medium-term objective of 0% of GDP, which means that 
new measures will have to be adopted in the next few years. Specifically, the 
recommendations of the European Commission required the Spanish authorities to 
achieve a structural adjustment of 0.65% of GDP in both 2019 and 2020 and that the 
growth of that part of public spending included in the calculations for these purposes 
should be limited to 0.6% in 2019 and 0.9% in 2020.10 However, given the legal 
period available for the formation of a new government following the November 
general elections, it is practically impossible for a state budget for 2020 to be 
approved by the end of this year, so that the 2018 budget will almost certainly be 
extended again. In any event, the European authorities have requested the Spanish 
government to submit a new budgetary plan for 2020, incorporating the necessary 
measures to ensure compliance with the objectives, as soon as the budget for next 
year has been approved.
Consumer price growth remained very moderate, in a setting marked 
by limited external inflationary pressures and domestic wage rises
Inflation,	as	measured	by	the	HICP,	has	remained	at	very	moderate	levels	in	
recent	months,	and	stood	at	0.5%	in	November	 (see Chart 15). This behaviour 
was determined mainly by the year-on-year energy price falls. Core inflation, 
meanwhile, stood at 1.1% in November, similar to the rates recorded since end-2017, 
despite the increase in the growth rate of labour costs and the widening of the 
10  The spending included in the calculations for the purposes of the expenditure rule applicable under the 
preventive arm of the SGP excludes interest expenditure, the non-discretionary elements of unemployment 
benefit	expenditure	and	the	expenses	funded	by	the	EU,	and	also	corrects	for	permanent	revenue	changes	
owing to regulatory changes (see Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact – 2019 Edition).
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Inflation in Spain retains a negative differential with the euro area, against the backgroud of year-on-year declines in the energy component.
Core inflation, for its part, is trending similarly in both areas. External inflationary pressures remain contained, although domestically wages
have risen.
MODERATE CONSUMER PRICES AND RISE IN WAGES
Chart 15
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat, Reuters, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones and Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
a Calculation of indices based on IPRI and IPRIM items reflected in the HICP.
b Based on information to November 2019.
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positive output gap. By component, services inflation stood at 1.6% in November, a 
rate similar to those observed since the beginning of last year, with some temporary 
changes associated with tourism-related items. For their part, non-energy industrial 
goods prices have grown at very moderate rates in recent months, with a year-on-
year rate of 0.3% in November. The recent inflation developments in Spain have 
been similar to those in the euro area, so that the negative inflation differential 
between Spain and the euro area has remained practically unchanged.
External	 inflationary	 pressures	 are	 modest,	 although	 the	 uncertainty	 over	
future	oil	price	developments	has	increased. Oil prices fell in the second half of 
September (following the rise associated with the attacks on oil-processing facilities 
in Saudi Arabia), stabilised in October and increased slightly in November, against a 
background of heightened uncertainty regarding the effects of the agreements 
reached at the recent OPEC meeting. Futures market information points to falling oil 
prices in the coming months. The producer prices of imported non-energy goods 
continue to show moderate year-on-year growth rates.
On	the	costs	side,	wage	indicators	have	continued	to	rise	in	recent	months.	
On data to November, wage rates under collective agreements have risen by an 
average of 2.3%, which is higher than the 1.8% rate recorded in 2018. The settlements 
on which these data are based cover what is now a very large number of workers (9 
million). The rises are higher under newly signed agreements which, to date, cover 
1.9 million workers. The average settlement in these agreements is a rise of 3.2%, 
slightly above the upper limit of the benchmark range included in the latest collective 
bargaining agreement. CNA average compensation data to Q3, show a similar rise, 
with year-on-year growth of 2.2% in the total economy and 1.7% in the market 
economy, following growth of around 1% in 2018. These developments arise from 
the larger wage increases negotiated and the increase in labour costs associated 
with the increases approved at the beginning of the year in the maximum contribution 
bases and in the minimum wage.
16.12.2019.
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SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLD FINANCES (EFF) 2017: METHODS, RESULTS 
AND CHANGES SINCE 2014
Published on 19 December 2019
This article presents the main results of the Survey of Household Finances 2017, 
which reflects the financial position of Spanish households at end-2017. It also 
describes the key changes to the income, assets, debt and spending of Spanish 
households compared with the last edition of the survey, referring to 2014. 
GLOBAL IMPACT OF A SLOWDOWN IN CHINA
Xu Bing, Moritz Roth and Daniel Santabárbara
Published on 3 December 2019
Given its systemic importance, a sharp and sustained economic slowdown in China 
affects the world economy, not only on account of its share of global GDP, but also 
because of its links with other economies through trade, the commodities markets 
and, on a more incipient level, the global financial system. Developments in China 
also have indirect effects on global uncertainty and confidence. This article presents 
various simulations of the negative impact that a sharper slowdown in the Chinese 
economy than expected by the main analysts would have on the global economy 
and, especially, on the euro area. Specifically, a further slowdown in annual growth 
of 1 pp in China would give rise to a decline in global growth of 0.4 pp in a year, with 
particularly marked effects on commodities producers and on the Asian economies.
RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN 2018 AND IN THE FIRST 
THREE QUARTERS OF 2019
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 29 November 2019
According to the annual survey of the Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBA), the 
activity of non-financial corporations remained on an upward trend in 2018, although 
it was a more moderate one than in the preceding year. The quarterly survey (CBQ) 
suggests that this slowdown intensified in the first nine months of 2019, which 
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translated into smaller increases in ordinary profit and employment than in the 
previous year. In this connection, the return on ordinary activities, which had 
increased slightly in 2018, remained relatively stable in the first three quarters of this 
year. Extraordinary costs and revenues, meanwhile, had a positive impact on the net 
profit for 2018, but had the opposite effect in the first nine months of 2019. Also a 
change in trend is observed in the financial position of corporations, insofar as 
average debt ratios continued to decline in 2018, but rose in the first nine months of 
2019. Finally, the debt burden ratio declined in both periods, driven mainly by the 
ongoing decline – albeit at a slowing pace – in financial costs. This article includes 
two boxes, the first of which analyses the economic and financial performance of 
SMEs on the basis of data to 2018. The second box studies the degree of financial 
vulnerability of the Spanish corporate sector and its sensitivity to a hypothetical 
deterioration in the macrofinancial scenario.
A CRISIS EARLY WARNING MODEL FOR EURO AREA COUNTRIES
Jose González Mínguez and Carmen Martínez Carrascal
Published on 25 November 2019
The article summarises the findings obtained in the estimation of an economic crisis 
early warning model for the euro area countries. These findings show that monitoring 
five variables that may indicate the emergence of macro-financial imbalances – 
current account balance, unit labour costs relative to the rest of the euro area, 
household indebtedness, corporate indebtedness and sovereign risk premium – 
helps facilitate the early detection of downturns in the euro area countries. As 
expected, the model points to a widespread euro area-wide increase in the probability 
of a decline in activity towards the middle of the last decade, just before the start of 
the Great Recession. Compared with the core euro area economies, the increase in 
crisis probability was much more pronounced in the periphery countries, driven by 
a worsening of the current account balance, growing private sector indebtedness 
and deteriorating competitiveness. In several of these economies, the probability of 
downturn predicted by the model heightened in 2011-2012, coinciding with the 
successive sovereign debt crisis episodes. Since then the probabilities of downturn 
have moderated substantially and are now low in most countries, albeit in some 
cases still above those observed at the turn of the century.
THE HOUSEHOLD SAVING RATE IN SPAIN BETWEEN 2007 AND 2016: 
DECOMPOSITION BY POPULATION GROUP AND POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS
Brindusa Anghel, Cristina Barceló and Ernesto Villanueva
Published on 18 November 2019
The article quantifies the contributions made by different household groups to the 
change in the aggregate household saving rate in Spain between 2007 and 2016. 
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Against the backdrop of the last crisis – heightened uncertainty and significant 
labour market deterioration – the findings show that certain household groups 
reduced their expenditure over the course of the downturn and then increased it 
again at the start of the recovery phase. Both these patterns are consistent with the 
hypothesis of precautionary saving. In particular, between 2007 and 2013, university-
educated households and households with lower secondary education at most 
made a similar contribution to the increase in the saving rate, although the group 
with the lowest level of education, who are usually poorer, made a relatively higher 
contribution to the fall in the saving rate in 2013 to 2016. By year of birth, the group 
aged under 45 in 2007 made the largest contribution to the increase in the saving 
rate during the downturn. When households are grouped by the tenure status of their 
main residence, it was observed that homeowners with housing debt outstanding 
made a particularly high contribution to the increase in the saving rate in 2007 to 
2013.
REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2019
Published on 7 November 2019
This article analyses the recent performance of the main Latin American economies 
(Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru). In the first three quarters of 
2019 the region’s growth was once again lower than expected and below that of 
other emerging areas of reference. This lower growth is essentially explained by 
domestic factors (political and economic policy uncertainty and structural 
problems of low potential growth), although the external environment has not 
been favourable either in terms of developments in world demand and in the terms 
of trade. Most central banks in the region have reduced policy interest rates given 
the absence of inflationary pressures, the existence of negative output gaps and 
the relatively stable performance of exchange rates. Fiscal space is limited in 
most of the economies and certain risks to the sustainability of their public 
finances persist in some of them. The main international organisations and private 
institutions expect activity to rise in the coming quarters, especially domestic 
demand. This would be based on looser financial conditions and improved 
external conditions (lower trade tensions) and domestic conditions (agents’ 
confidence). In this setting, the balance of risks is tilted downwards, given the 
persisting doubts about economic policies in the main countries in the region and 
about the dissipation of political uncertainty, and about the improvement of the 
international economic situation.
This report includes two boxes. Box 1 analyses the channels which could be 
transmitting global trade tensions to Latin America. Box 2 describes the economic 
situation in Argentina after the worsening of the financial turmoil last summer.
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THE FEDERAL RESERVE REVIEW OF ITS MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK
Susana Párraga, Pedro del Río and Juan Luis Vega
Published on 28 October 2019
This article offers an overview of the monetary policy framework review currently 
being conducted by the United States Federal Reserve (Fed). First, we examine the 
alternative strategies under consideration to address the likely greater incidence of 
episodes in which monetary policy is influenced by the existence of an effective 
lower bound (ELB) to which the policy rate can fall. We also discuss how the available 
empirical evidence drawn from the Fed’s own experience makes it likely that it will 
retain in its toolkit the non-conventional monetary policy instruments adopted in the 
wake of the global financial crisis to tackle the problem of the greater incidence of 
the ELB: namely, quantitative easing and forward guidance. Finally, we analyse 
possible changes in the Fed’s communications policy.
BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN: OCTOBER 2019
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas
Published on 22 October 2019
In 2019 Q3, according to the Bank Lending Survey, loan supply in Spain remained 
generally stable, with only credit standards for consumer credit to households 
tightening slightly, and terms and conditions on new loans for house purchase easing 
somewhat. By contrast, in the euro area, credit standards mostly eased while the 
overall terms and conditions tightened. In Spain, loan demand across all categories 
is estimated to have decreased, while demand from the two household segments 
appears to have increased in the euro area. Conditions of access to wholesale and 
retail funding markets remained stable or improved in nearly all cases during the 
quarter, both in Spain and in the euro area. In the last six months, the ECB’s expanded 
asset purchase programme continued to have a positive effect on banks’ liquidity 
and financing conditions, although the impact on banks’ profitability in the euro area 
appears to have been negative. This programme also continued to contribute to an 
easing of the terms and conditions of loans, and to an increase in the volume of 
lending, in nearly all segments. Lastly, the ECB’s negative deposit facility rate is 
estimated to have contributed, in the last six months, to the drop in the net interest 
income of Spanish and euro area banks, and to the lower interest rates applied to 
new loans. In the euro area, the negative interest rates also favoured a reduction in 
margins and an increase in lending volumes.
TARIFF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES AND SPANISH GOODS EXPORTS
Eduardo Gutiérrez Chacón and César Martín Machuca
Published on 17 October 2019
The rise in global protectionist tensions in recent years has, after decades of across-
the-board declines, entailed increases in tariffs that are proving detrimental to 
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international trade and thereby affecting the Spanish economy’s external sector 
outlook. This article estimates the effect of tariffs on Spanish non-energy, non-EU 
goods exports drawing on data broken down by country of destination and type of 
product. The results show that an increase in tariffs adversely impacts both export 
possibilities and, persistently, export values. On the estimates made, a 1% increase 
in import tariffs imposed by another country on a Spanish product entails a reduction 
in nominal exports of around 0.6%. Protectionist risks underscore the role of the EU 
in promoting international trade agreements, such as those recently entered into 
with Japan, Canada and Mercosur.
LEVERAGED LOANS: DEFINITION AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Carlos González Pedraz
Published on 10 October 2019
Over the past decade, the volume of leveraged loans has grown to reach its highest 
level since the end of the crisis. Growth has been more contained in Spain, which 
accounted for 5% of the total volume of such lending in Europe in the period 2016-
2018.
The terms and conditions of leveraged loans have become less restrictive and a 
large proportion is distributed among institutional investors worldwide, in the form of 
collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). This originate-to-distribute model poses 
potential risks for the financial system. In the event of a cyclical downturn the losses 
in this market could be significant, in particular, owing to the relaxation of investor 
protections. In addition, given the importance of these loans as a source of corporate 
financing, a rise in defaults would have adverse effects on the real economy.
RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS TO 2019 Q2
Álvaro Menéndez
Published on 26 September 2019
On information from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), 
activity at non-financial corporations slowed in 2019 Q1, with gross value added 
(GVA) increasing very moderately (0.4%), below that posted in the same period last 
year. Employment continued to rise (0.6%), but also at a slower pace than in 2018. In 
this setting, the return on investment ratio declined slightly, while debt ratios rose 
somewhat, reversing the downward trend of recent years. However, the decline in 
average borrowing costs, together with the slight growth in profit, led to a further 
decrease in the debt burden ratio, down to all-time lows in the CBQ historical series. 
The article includes a box which shows that the average headcount at Spanish firms 
in 2017 stood below the pre-crisis level. However, despite this aggregate performance, 
a significant proportion of firms were able to increase their headcount during the 
period analysed.
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on its website at http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Relacionados/Fic/Catalogo-
publicaciones.pdf.
The list of articles published in the Economic Bulletin since 1990 can be consulted at http://www.bde.
es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/BoletinEconomico/indice_general_
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIReF Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility
AMCESFI Macroprudential Authority Financial Stability Board
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
BOP Balance of Payments
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFB European Fiscal Board
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MREL Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAIRU Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
